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"The Right Honble. Secretary then congratulated the House upon the temper with which *the Campaign* "in that House had commenced."—Report of Mr. Canning's Speech, 19, Jan. 1809.

SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

SPANISH REVOLUTION.——The dismal news is, at last, arrived. The truth of the abused Bulletins is, at last, established to its utmost latitude. The pledge of throwing the English into the sea is, almost to the literal meaning, fulfilled. All the falshoods of all the hired writers are, at last, completely exposed.——*My* readers, at any rate, have, from the first, been prepared for what has happened. That is now come to pass; all those truths are now apparent, which, if they had been acted upon by our ministers, would have prevented those calamities, which have now plunged the nation, the buoyed up and cheated nation, into mourning; and, for the publishing of which truths, the hirelings of the day charged me with being "instigated by the devil."——For my own part, I, who, free from the buz of report and from the influence of other men's opinions, had taken a calm view of the Spanish nation as it was previous to the revolution; who had followed the *known* events of that revolution with an impartial eye; and who have never suffered myself to be carried away by any statements, not well-authenticated: I could never see the smallest chance of beating Napoleon in Spain, unless the *people* were let loose; unless the country were thrown into a complete state of revolution; unless all the bands of despotism were burst in sunder. From the moment that the health of "His most Catholic Majesty, Ferdinand VII." was toasted, at the London Tavern, by our Secretary of State for foreign affairs; from that moment, I clearly saw, and as clearly said, that the war was to be carried on for the interests of a faction. From that moment, I said, that the *people* would not stir; that they would be cool and indifferent spectators of the contest, and that our army, if one should be sent thither, would be very lucky not to find enemies in those, in whom they would be taught to expect the warmest of friends. How many men, how many of our unfortunate countrymen, have, since that day, had the woeful conviction of these timely truths! How many bodies are now left to fertilize the soil of Joseph Buonaparte's kingdom, who, if my advice had been taken, would have been living for their country's defence!——If to the just anger and indignation of the people of this country, who have seen their means so wasted, their character so tarnished, their name become such a reproach amongst nations; if, to this anger and indignation, any addition could be made, it would, assuredly, be found in the flippancy, the jocularity, the gaiety, of the publications, which have been made in the Courier and the Morning Post news-papers, under the title of Speeches made by *Lord Castlereagh* and *Mr. Canning*, and of the last of which I have taken the closing sentence, by way of motto to these remarks. The authors of these publications must have known, that, in all human probability, our army, in Spain, was, at that moment, suffering every species of pain of which the mind can form an idea. When making these publications, could they have dismissed from their imaginations, the many and cruel torments into which that army had been plunged? When discussing the war in Spain, and gaily alluding to it in a figure representing the wordy wars of the House of Commons; when jocosely alluding to "the campaign," could they have forgotten that it was the campaign in Leon and Galicia? Would not men, in whose breasts only a scanty portion of mercy or compassion existed, have, upon the bare mention of the word "campaign," been carried, in idea, to the scene of anxiety, danger, fear, confusion, distress and misery, in those provinces? Would they not have seen waggons and magazines a prey to the floods and the flames, destroyed by the hands of those to whom they ought to have been a comfort and a defence? Would they not have had before their eyes, the trooper butchering the faithful sharer of his toils, when no longer able to accelerate his flight; and the poor exhausted wretch, unable to keep pace, no longer to be propped up by the assistance of his comrades, drop by the way,

following those comrades with longing eyes, eyes destined never more to behold comrade, kindred, or country? Did the pale the woeful, the heart-piercing visage of one of these unfortunate creatures never come athwart the minds of the authors of these jocular speeches? Did they never think of the hundred and fifty miles of road strewed with stores (the fruit of English labour), with the carcasses of English horses, and the bodies of Englishmen, perishing from wounds, fatigue, or hunger?——But, while Rome burnt, Nero *fiddled*; the bloody head of John the Baptist was presented to a damsel at a *dance*; and it is universally true, that the Monkey and the Tyger meet in the same mind, or, in other words, that the most complete want of feeling is inseparable from levity, a maxim more emphatically expressed by our great poet, when he says, that "a man may smile and smile and be a villain."——Now, mark me, reader; I do not pretend to ascribe these speeches, such as I have found them in the newspapers above-mentioned, to Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Canning. All the exceptionable parts of them may, for aught I know, have been foisted in by the reporters. I find them printed and published; and, as printed publications, I express my abhorrence of their unfeeling contents, which, at a moment like that when these publications were made, when, besides the general fear and sorrow that prevailed, there must have been two or three hundred thousand individuals in this kingdom half frantic with anxiety for the personal safety of their kindred and friends, were an insult to public opinion and feeling of which, I hope, no one but the authors of these publications could possibly have been guilty.——The reported debates in parliament, upon the subject of the Spanish Revolution, present us with very little that is new. The only excuse for not anticipating Napoleon is, that, until October, the Central Junta was not established; and that, before it was established, it would not have been prudent to send an army into Spain. Now, the public will recollect, that the Convention of Cintra, which took place in *August*, was justified upon the ground, that any sacrifice ought to be made, *in order to hasten the march of our army into Spain*; and, Sir Hew Dalrymple says this in his dispatch, where he speaks also of the vast importance of getting possession of the passes of the Pyrenees before the French army should arrive. Sir Hew Dalrymple would hardly have talked in this way to a ministry, who had given him no authority to march into Spain; and this, observe, was on the *22nd of August*. But, be this as it may; whether or not, the ministers knew it to be imprudent to send an army into Spain, until the Central Junta was established, their conduct still retains its blameable character; for, when the delay had continued so long, *they should have known*, that it was *too late* to send an army into Spain. It was their business to know this. We pay Lord Castlereagh and Mr. Canning *six thousand pounds a year each*, besides numerous thousands to their relations, for attending to such matters; to obtain and make use of such knowledge; and, for them now to tell us, that they fear no censure, that they do not look upon themselves as culprits, because they have done *their best*, is something that, in better times, would not be borne with patience. Nations whose affairs are well-managed, do not pay any man 6,000 pounds a year for doing *his best*. Where they pay such a sum, in the way of salary, they expect, and demand, corresponding services. For persons, in such situations, to commit blunders is to commit crimes. What responsibility is there, or can there be, if the accused is to be acquitted upon the plea of having *meant well?* Sir Robert Calder, who, with an inferior force, beat the enemy, and captured two of his ships, was disgraced upon the express ground of an *error in judgment*. And shall no disgrace attend those, who, having all the means of the country, and all the means of correct information, in their hands, planned the campaign of Leon and Galicia; where an army, one of the largest ever sent from England, had no chance of safety but in flight; where, to save *a part* from being captured, the rest were compelled to expose themselves to inevitable destruction?——From what was said, in the debates, about waiting for the formation of a Central Junta, it appears evident enough, I think, that *we* shall be found to have been at the bottom of the scheme of a war for Ferdinand VII, "His Most Catholic Majesty," who offered to marry one of Buonaparte's relations. Of this bright scheme it will, I am fully persuaded, finally appear, that we were the authors. This is a point of vast importance. Of much more importance than all the rest; because upon it turns the question, *for what* we are expending all this blood and treasure. Mr. Robinson (I wonder who *he* is) that moved the Address, in answer

to the Speech from the throne, threw out some hints, that there *might* be certain persons, who wished us not to assist the Spaniards, unless they first resolved to change their government. I was one of those persons; and my wish was founded upon these two reasons; first, because it was sheer folly to suppose, that those, who were content with the old order of things, without any reform of corruptions and abuses, would ever fight manfully against Napoleon; would ever succeed in resisting his dukes and his legions: and, second, because, for the sake of the Spaniards themselves, and for the sake of other nations, and England in particular, it was not desirable that they should succeed, if such were their object. I have, all along, expressed this opinion; and, if it had been entertained by the ministers, we should not now have to mourn over the sufferings and death of so many valuable men. It was notorious; it was a fact known to every man, of any information, in all Europe, that the Spaniards were so degraded by their government, that they had none of the feelings of a people left in them. What was to be expected from such a population, unless some *grand convulsion* could have been effected? Such a community, if it be worthy of the name, must be turned up-side-down; must be shook to pieces and new moulded, before any thing like military exertion can be reasonably expected from it. This work of renovation was, *by the help of the press*, going on, till the Central Junta was formed, and began to preach up tranquillity and put a stop to "*licentious* publications." After this we heard no more of "*a reform of abuses*," and of "the *late infamous government*." Nothing now was to be heard but of "our lord and sovereign Don Ferdinand the VII." and of sober lectures, not unaccompanied with dreadful denunciations, issued in his name. These had no effect; or an effect the contrary of what they were intended to produce. Read the proclamations, the terrific menaces of Romana and Palafox, and then believe, if you can, that the *people* of Spain were enthusiastic in the cause of "His Catholic Majesty Ferdinand VII." Men, whom, to draw out in defence of their country, it is necessary to threaten with the gallows, cannot, I think, be looked upon as very enthusiastic in its cause. The numerous falsehoods of our news-papers, respecting the dispositions of the Spanish people, can no longer be disguised. Every officer, every soldier, who returns, will have his dismal tale to tell. I shall, probably, see none of them; but, many of my readers will; and to them I leave the decision upon the correctness, or incorrectness of my opinions, which, to say the truth, were entertained by every *politician* that I have ever conversed with upon the subject.——These opinions I expressed to an officer of great merit and sense, just before his departure; and, if he has lived out the campaign, he will, I am sure, have had thousands of opportunities of witnessing the truth of what I said.——It was impossible; it was not in nature, that such a people should be roused to battle by such means. Buonaparté now laughs at our folly in supposing the thing possible, in engaging in such a wild scheme. Well he may. And why did not our ministers know this before? Why did they not tender to the people of Spain those things which Buonaparté has tendered to them? It is false; grossly false, to say that the Spanish nation did not wish to be freed from oppression. We never made them the offer. We never encouraged them to break their chains. We took part with the adherents of one branch of the late royal family; we royalized the cause of Spain; we made it a contest between king Ferdinand and king Joseph; we fought for a king and an aristocracy, whom the people *knew*, against one whom they knew not, and who, at any rate, *promised* them better days than they, or even their fathers, ever saw.——This has been our conduct, and this conduct has led to failure, accompanied with every possible circumstance of national mortification and disgrace. This, therefore, ought to be the first object of inquiry; but, as the public will see, it will never be an object of inquiry at all.——Let us now look, a little, at the dismal close of the campaign. I believe, that our soldiers behaved well before Corunna; I have no doubt that they did, and that they beat equal numbers opposed to them; but, I cannot agree with General Hope, in calling it a "*victory*;" and, I do beseech the public not to give way to any *boasting* upon the subject. Our army *fought for their lives*, let it be remembered. All that were not killed may be said to have *escaped*. Under such circumstances, to talk of a "victory" is to make a quite new application of the word, and, upon other occasions, to render its meaning dubious. ——Of poor General Moore, the end, at any rate, was becoming. The enemy had him at bay; but, there he shewed himself to be a brave man; he did not, *as generals*

some times have done, make a disgraceful capitulation, and slink home himself to be the bearer of the news, leaving the wretched companions of his flight exposed to danger and hardship. He, at any rate, saved, by his valour, the remnant of his naked and famishing and lacerated army; to the disgrace of flight, he did not add that of base capitulation. Rather than do this, he bravely met almost certain death; and, therefore, whatever might be the errors of his conduct during the campaign, his fall will be deeply and universally regretted, and his memory held in honour. Great praise is, on this account, due to Generals Baird and Hope; because it is certain, that if any one of them had, *as some others have done*, shunned personal danger, the far greater part of the remains of our army would have gone to a French prison, instead of coming to England.—— It is impossible to form an idea of a state of existence more painful than that of poor General Moore must have been for the last six weeks. He found himself unsupported by the people of Spain; he found half-enemies where he had been led to expect enthusiastic friends; he saw the Spanish levies, at the approach of the French, melt away like new-fallen snow before an April sun; and, yet, hearing the English news-papers continually vomiting forth the numbers and the enthusiasm of "the noble and valiant" people of Spain; the glorious efforts of the "*universal Spanish nation;*" hearing this, and knowing well how easily the faults of ministers are thrown upon commanders, he must naturally have dreaded a return to England without *doing something*. That something he attempted, and hence all his and his army's calamities.——But, shall we not be informed of the purport of the orders that were given him from home? Shall we not know, whether he was ordered to advance, when he was about to retreat? I doubt it. The nation seems to be dead. There is no spirit remaining in it. If there had been, indeed, this great calamity never would have happened. The scene exhibited at Portsmouth, this very day, where officers have been carried on shore, one after another, upon hammocks; where the hospitals are crowded with the sick and wounded, and where, such is the condition in which the poor wretches of soldiers are, that it can scarcely be distinguished to what corps they belong; such scenes would, one would think, fill the people [illegible] nation against the authors of all [illegible] disgrace. But, no: like Jews, we confine our feelings merely to *sorrow*; we are become a *crying* nation. A poor, spiritless, cowed-down, abject race. Cry! The time was when Englishmen would have cursed as well as cried. So do they now, indeed, in *secret*; but not one man, who has the power to enforce his demands; not one man of this description, will openly call for redress.——The public will remember (but will not resent or profit from) the train of lies, which has been dealt out to them, from time to time, since the commencement of the war in Spain. Forget them, however, they cannot. They cannot have, already at least, forgotten how flatly the statements of the French bulletins were contradicted; and how greedily they gave into the contradiction. From lie to lie we have been led on, until, at last, we see the remnant of our fleeing and perishing army land upon our shores. It is only four days since the Courier news-paper told us, and, apparently, under high authority, that our army had reached Corunna in *safety*; that the Spaniards had defeated Joseph Buonaparté, killing 15,000 of his men; and that the Duke de l'Infantado was in pursuit of Buonaparté. *Now;* now, when the half-dead remnant of the army has actually arrived to tell its own tale; now the lie of the day is of a new sort. Now the *numbers* are nothing like what they were thought to be. Once our army in Spain was 45,000 strong; when the first retreat was sounded, it fell to 35,000; when the dispatches of Sir John Moore came from Benevente, it came down to 28,000; and now (oh, the infamous liars!) they have brought it so low as 24,000, and the Courier, who only backs a brother liar, says, that "*it is said* our army, in Spain, never "consisted of more than 24 thousand men. "*We thought* it had been *stronger.*" Aye, or else you deserve to be kicked back all the way to John a Grote's house; for you, scores of times, positively stated it at above 40 thousand. The scheme now is, however, to lessen the numbers as much as possible, and for more than one motive too evident to mention. But, if there were a member of parliament, who would call for the detailed Returns of the corps sent to Portugal and Spain, we should soon see this scheme blown into the air. In the mean while, we *know*, that there were 35 thousand men in Portugal, at the time when the Wellesley Armistice was signed; we knew that 10 thousand men went out with Gen. Baird; that makes the amount 45 thousand men, exclusive of those, since

gone out under General Cradock, and, still more recently, under another General, whose name I have forgotten. Well, now; what is become of the *forty five* thousand men? How many of them remained in Portugal? Let us but know that, and also how many have escaped, through Corunna and Vigo, and then we shall know how many have perished in Lord Castlereagh's Campaign. This is the proper object of inquiry. What is the use of declamatory speeches? Let us have some *facts*, and leave us to judge for ourselves. Let us have a Return of the killed, wounded, and missing, from the time that the regiments *left England*. That is what I want to see; but, it is what we never shall have. By one of *our* bulletins, published on Saturday last, the credulous public were informed, that "it was *apprehended*, that a sacrifice of "*some* horses, baggage, and stores, would "be unavoidable, but there was *no doubt* "that *nearly the whole* of the troops would "be got off;" leaving that word *whole* to be applied to the army as it *entered* Spain. "Some horses," indeed! *How many* will come back in all? Buonaparté, who, when he sent off his last bulletin, had pursued our army as far as Astorga, says that "the road was strewed with dead horses "belonging to the English, with travel-"ling carriages, with artillery, with co-"vered waggons, and warlike stores." He says, that he found, at Astorga, magazines of sheets and blankets and pioneering implements; that the Duke of Dalmatia found 2,000 sick in Leon, either of Romana's or our army; that we burnt immense magazines at Benevente; and, that, upon the road between Benevente and Astorga, a distance of about 20 miles out of from 150 to 200, he picked up two hundred waggons of baggage and ammunition. And yet we are told, in one of our government bulletins, that "it was *apprehended*, "that a sacrifice of *some* horses, baggage, "and stores *would be* unavoidable!" The public will not believe these bulletins again; but, *as a cover for its baseness in not shewing its resentment*, it will pretend to believe them, and to believe, too, all that is now said about the small original amount of our army. Nothing is easier than to ascertain the amount of our loss, in every way. Let some one call for the returns, from every department, of what was sent out, placing the *cost* against each article. *This*, indeed, would be fit and useful employment for "a guardian of the public purse." Declamation, and even reasoning, are, in such cases, a waste of words and time. Facts speak for themselves, and carry conviction not to be shaken.—— Amongst other Returns, which this burthened public ought to be made acquainted with, is that of the *Deserters*; especially as we read, in all the news-papers, that the Emperor Napoleon says, that "all the "*Germans*, in the pay of the English, are "*deserting*." The cost of the "*Foreign* "*Corps*," last year, is stated in the public accounts, to be more than *one fifth* of the cost of *the whole of the British regular army*; and it, surely, becomes the "guardians of the public purse," to ascertain, whether troops, maintained at so enormous an expence, have deserted, as the Emperor of France, in the face of his army and of the world, declares they have. If the fact be true, it is of great importance to us, that some measure should be taken in consequence of it, not only in a pecuniary point of view, but as the example may operate upon our own army; and, if it be false, justice to these foreigners demands an unequivocal and speedy contradiction of the Emperor's assertions. But, it must be observed before hand, that assertion, unsupported by *proof*, and the very best proof that the case admits of, will not satisfy the world, and ought not to satisfy any man. The Emperor's assertion *may* be false; it may be totally groundless, though it is not very easy to conceive a reason for his publishing such a falsehood; but, at any rate, the assertion has been made, and the truth, or falsehood, should be ascertained by detailed returns and reports. It is quite in vain to abuse Napoleon, to call him a liar and a calumniator. He has made a distinct assertion, of which assertion we have it completely in our power to *ascertain* the truth, or the falshood; and, if we, or rather, the parliament, decline doing it, the world will be at no loss what to believe upon the subject.——There is another assertion in the bulletins well worthy of formal and authentic contradiction. We were informed, that *General Stewart*, a brother of Lord Castlereagh, when the horse under his command took Gen. Lefebvre, was *greatly*, nay, four or five to one, *inferior* to the French in point of *amount of force*. Now, let us hear what the emperor has said upon this affair. "The English had re-"ported throughout the country that they "had defeated 5000 of the French caval-"ry on the banks of the Ezela, and that the "field of battle was covered with their "dead. The inhabitants of Benevente "were much surprised upon visiting the

" field of battle, to have found there only " three Englishmen and two French. " That contest of 400 men against 2000, " does great honour to the French. During " the whole of the 29th, the river con- " tinued to swell considerably, so that at " the close of the evening it became im- " possible to ford it. It was in the mid- " dle of the river, and at the moment he " was on the point of being drowned, that " General Lefebvre, being carried away " by the current to the side occupied by " the English, was made prisoner."—— Which are we to believe? " Our own " story," to be sure, say the " loyal;" but which will the world believe? It is easy for us, however, to get at some *proof* upon the point; and we ought to do it; for, if we do not, we may be sure, that the opinions of mankind will, at best, be divided.——As intimately connected with this, the following paragraph, from the Courier of the 24th instant, is worthy of being put upon record. " It appears that " Buonaparté ceased superintending in " person the operations against us, after " the arrival of the French army at Astorga, " on the 2d. He says in his last bulletin, " dated Astorga, that he left the charge of " pursuing us to the point of embarkation, to " the duke of Dalmatia.—Probably he had " received information that *rendered it ne- " cessary for him to return to Madrid*, though " we fear the report *transmitted to Govern- " ment*, of the French *having been driven " from the Capital, is unfounded*. There is " an account circulated UPON GOOD " AUTHORITY that Buonaparté was, " at one time, *in a situation of some peril*, " When Gen. Lefebvre was taken prison- " er, Buonaparté was himself on a height " on the other side of the river, about two " miles from the scene of action. Gen. " Stewart was apprised of the circum- " stance, and *had he not been* RESTRAIN- " ED *by the* POSITIVE *orders which he had " previously received*, he would have en- " deavoured to have got in the rear of " Buonaparté, and have *made a dash at " him*. His *orders*, however, being *positive*, " and the risk considerable, he did not " think it proper to make the attempt." Now, *what* is the " *good authority*," upon which this Bobadilian story rests? It is evident, that no authority, with regard to what General Stewart *thought* about it, can be *good*, unless it come from Gen. Stewart himself; and, the inevitable conclusion is, that the General has himself spread this vain-glorious, this Bully-Bluff-like report; or, which one must hope to be the case, the editor of the Courier has, here again, as it were to mock the grief of the nation, promulgated an empty boasting falshood. ——Hundreds and thousands of stories, of this stamp, will, however, now be resorted to, with a view of amusing the public mind, of drawing it off from contemplating the loss, the misery and the disgrace, the numberless *national* disgraces, of this campaign. But, when we see the remnant of the army tumbling, helter-skelter, on board the first vessel they can reach; when we see the balls and bomb-shells falling thick as hail-stones around and amongst the fugitive ships; when we see the poor creatures, who have finally escaped, who have survived this complication of dangers and of miseries, creeping to our shores, one after another, in a state worse than that of mariners after shipwreck; when we see all this, when we actually, with our own eyes, behold the half-naked, emaciated, ghost-looking, remains of our once stout, well equipped, and gaily-dressed army, is it possible that we can be such senseless animals, such brute beasts, as to give into a train of boasting about " *victories* and *laurels?*" Oh! this is not the way to recover our character. This is not the way to prevent such calamities in future. It is a deep sense of our loss, and our national disgrace, that should now have possession of our minds; never, for one moment, losing sight of that important truth, of which every soul in ourunfortunate army has now had such woeful experience, that, to induce a people to rise in arms against a powerful invader, they must first, not be *told*, but made to feel, THAT THEY HAVE SOMETHING TO FIGHT FOR.

West India Docks.—Merely as a *commercial* matter, I should not have been disposed to bestow much attention upon this subject; but, as bringing to light some most interesting facts, connected with the cause of morality, it is of very great public importance.——From a Report of a Committee of the Dock Company, which Report will be found in another part of this double number, the public will see of what immense advantage this establishment has been, in a commercial point of view; and, from what I am now about to state, they will see, that it has been of a still greater advantage in the cutting off of the means of robbery.——The book published some years ago by one of the police magistrates, was not necessary to convince me, or any other person, who had

had but the smallest transactions in the way of shipping or receiving merchandize, that the thieves upon the waters bore the same proportion as to land thieves, that the fish do to terrestrial creatures. All appeared to be thievery and plunder; and, it is a fact well-known amongst merchants, that thousands upon thousands of persons lived upon, and openly gloried in, this plunder, part of which came out of the revenue, but the far greater part out of the pockets of individuals. So bold were the persons who carried on this trade of thieving, that a remonstrance was very lucky if it did not produce some act of violence upon the person making it. I myself have seen women carrying away sugar and coffee, in their aprons, and drawing off the molasses into mugs, in open day-light. But, these petty thefts, though their flagrancy clearly enough shows how little care was taken of the property of the West India merchant and planter, sink out of sight when compared with acts such as that of which I am now about to speak, and which I give, not as any thing rare, but by way of pretty fair specimen.——A ship arrived from the West Indies; and being entered, what is called a master *Lumper* was, in the usual way, engaged to discharge the cargo for about thirty guineas. He accordingly proceeded in doing that duty for nearly a month, when the owner was informed by one of the sailors, that the Lumpers continued working during the nights, as well as the days; and that he had heard the master-Lumper say to the Captain, that, as he must be a good deal fatigued, he had better go to sleep; that something should be put under his pillow to make him rest comfortably; and that the sum mentioned between them was two hundred guineas. The Lumper also engaged to *take care* of the revenue officers, in order that he (the captain) should not be disturbed. This being agreed upon, the master-Lumper came on board with his people (a fine gang of thieves!), about eleven o'clock at night, and, going seriously to work with bags and boats, and continuing the practice for eight or ten nights before the owner was informed of it, was supposed, in the course of that time, to have carried off about *twenty tons of sugar*, together with a proportion of other things. The merchant, upon being informed of the matter, went on board with a friend, accused the captain of having countenanced these villainous proceedings, and having taken him by surprize, he could not deny the fact, but pretended, that he was not aware of the extent to which they had been carried. The merchant, however, was so fully convinced of his guilt, that he lodged an information against him, and sent a constable to apprehend him. The constable was so *unfortunate* as to miss the rogue, which is almost always the case in that region of theft and plunder. The Captain absconded, and, as to a country of congenial manners and morals; as to a home pointed out by instinct, he, as has since appeared, immediately fled to the American States.——Now, estimating the value of the sugar stolen upon this occasion, at the present gazetted price, the amount of loss, upon this one cargo, would be £.1,580, or, enough to maintain thirty thieves, for a year, at the rate of twenty shillings a week for each.——This may be thought an extreme case, and, I am willing so to suppose it; but, as to the amount of the goods stolen, we must consider, that the plunder was in the article of sugar, not so portable and far less valuable than several other West India productions, in the first stage of the operations on ship-board. It must be recollected, that vessels were usually from three to six weeks, and, sometimes, two or three months, unlading their cargoes; that it was no unusual circumstance for goods to remain a like period in lighters on the water. During all this time the pillage must have been going on, the only protection being the honesty, or *moderation*, of the lightermen and river-watchmen, on whom there was *no check*, the goods not being weighed till landed on the quays. *Here* the duty and the ship-owner's charge for freight were ascertained and secured; but, the unfortunate West India planter (whom I cannot help regarding as the most ill-treated of mankind) was afterwards exposed to the malpractices of porters, carmen, warehouse-men, and ship-coopers, with the additional mortification of knowing, that, to the loss of his goods, he had now to add the amount of duty, freight, and all other charges, some of which made by these numerous licenced-thieves for having *taken care* of what they had *stolen*. It was a rule at the free quays, that the Wharfinger should not be chargeable with any loss of weight, *after weighing to ascertain the amount of the duty*, unless that loss exceeded 28 pounds on a hogshead, *even during twenty four hours*. There needs nothing more than a bare knowledge of this fact to shew to what extent the plunder upon the proprietor was carried, and with what impunity it existed. No wonder

that tribes of petty plunderers were seen, as I have frequently seen them, carrying often sugar and coffee from the quays in open day, and without any apparent apprehension of the consequences. There is little doubt that they purchased, in one way or another, permission thus to depredate upon the West India planter. There was something shockingly unjust, too, in first weighing the article to ascertain the duty; laying on that duty; and, after that not being answerable for the full weight to the owner of the goods. First the government took the goods out of his possession into theirs to ascertain the weight of them, in order to lay a tax thereon; and then they refused to be responsible, that *their own people* should not steal from him the goods, for which they had made him pay that tax.——As to the total amount of these abominable robberies, a gentleman, long conversant in the West India trade, has stated, in a letter, which has been shewn to me, that he took the sales of *several* parcels of sugar of the same marks, from the same estates, and, of course, the hogsheads were made by the same coopers, shipped from Jamaica by the same convoy. He compared the *London* sales with the sales at the *out-ports*, and he found the average difference of net weight to be 46¾ pounds upon each hogshead; which, of course, was the weight of what was stolen by the nest of villains upon and near the Thames. According to this gentleman's calculation, the annual loss on sugar, rum, coffee, and other West India commodities, in consequence of this deep-rooted system of plunder, amounted, before the Dock establishment existed, on an average to between *three* and *four hundred thousand pounds;* enough to maintain *eight thousand thieves* at the rate of *fifty pounds* a year for each thief. Dispose of the plunder how you please; send it through whatever channels; make what distribution you like; the result will finally be, that, owing to this system, eight thousand of the people of this country were maintained, were kept stewed up in London, living upon the fruit of theft, at a rate twice as high as common agricultural labourers are paid. What a shameful, what a disgraceful, what an infamous thing to be notoriously existing in a country, boasting of its laws and its morals! ——That which could put a stop to these practices; that which could effectually cut off this source of livelihood to cheats and thieves, may, with propriety, be called an institution "*for the Suppression of Vice;*" and such the West India Dock Company really appears to be. The system they have adopted is this: The ship's hold is, by law, secured by locks on her arrival at Gravesend, and no access is permitted to her cargo, till she is brought into the quay to unload. On reaching the Docks, she is admitted into the import Bason, where no person is allowed to remain on board during the night. The time requisite to unload an entire cargo is from six to ten or twelve days, according to the size of the ship. Immediately on being landed, the goods are weighed and lodged in the warehouses. No watchmen are employed, except as general guards, on the out-side of the walls. The entrances to the works and warehouses are strictly watched, and suspicious persons are subjected to examination; and, in short, if frauds or thefts are attempted, the difficulties in carrying off the booty, or of escaping detection, are too great to leave the smallest chance of being surmounted.——It is said, that there are persons, who cavil against this establishment; and where is the wonder, when we find, that, first or last, it must throw *eight thousand* persons out of bread, or compel them to earn the bread they eat, not by the slight of hand, but by the sweat of their brow? Only think of the machinations of such a phalanx of thieves! Only think of such a swarm of wasps and hornets, driven, all at once, from the sugar and molasses hogsheads on the king's quays! Oh! there is another swarm, who draw in their sustenance more circuitously, whose proboscises as well as whose stings are of greater length, and, of course, whose depredations and oppressions are more generally felt. Would to God that some "Society for the *Suppression of Vice*," would take these in hand! ——I will answer, now, that these eight thousand of ousted thieves are all found to be full of professions of "*loyalty;*" and that they accuse the Dock Company of something very nearly bordering upon Jacobinism. Nay, they are certainly "*innovators;*" that cannot be denied. They have broken in upon the "*established order of things;*" they have, in a most cunning manner, undermined the "*privileged orders;*" they have made a "*revolution;*" and are downright "*levellers,*" seeing that their great maxim is, that no man, be his post, or badge of honour, what it may, shall have any of their sugar, rum, or coffee, without first rendering them the worth of it, either in *money*, or in *services.*—— This subject, however, merits a view still

more extensive, and, of course, more worthy of general attention and consideration. ——What has been the *cause*, the great primary cause, of all this scandalous plunder? What is it that has rendered necessary the Dock Establishment, with all its cares and all its immense expences? Simply this: *the taxes upon West India productions.* In order to collect these taxes, the government was obliged to take the goods out of the hands of their proprietor, who, if left himself in possession of them, would have wanted no one to assist; nothing but the common law of the land, to assist him in the guarding of them. Wheat and other grain, scarcely less valuable in price, compared with the weight, than sugar and coffee, and still more necessary to man's subsistence, lie very quietly in places which a thief might, at any time, force in a moment. In frail buildings often at the distance of a mile from any inhabited dwelling. It is very seldom, compared to the number of barns and mills, that we hear of a theft in these commodities. And what is their protection? The knowledge, that they are *under the guardianship of the proprietor.* If they, too, were subjected to a transfer of possession, like that which takes place in the case of sugar, we should see exactly the same plundering going on with respect to them. By this transfer property loses its sacredness; it does not *belong* unto him who *has* it. To know this is quite sufficient to dissipate the idea of proprietorship, and to let loose a disposition to plunder. In vain do you impose oaths, form checks, set watches ten deep; nothing will, or can, psevent goods, in this situation, from being stolen. The Dock Company have, doubtless, done much; but, I defy even their walls, the very existence of which constitutes so damning a proof of prevalent dishonesty; I defy even their walls, and I would defy ramparts and cannons, if they had them, to prevent thieving, as long as it is known, that he who has the *possession* is not the *proprietor*, or, which is the same thing, the agent chosen by the proprietor. It is a pleasing reflection, that crimes have been diminished; that hordes of the vilest of thieves have been broken up; that there will exist less temptation; that eight thousand less persons will leave their honest and productive labour in the country to go and share in the plunder upon the Thames; but, in a greater or less degree, as long as the tax exists, and is collected in such a way, so long will it continue to engender idleness and thieving, and to spread its baleful influence over the land. The moment the lock is put upon the hold of the ship, at Gravesend, that moment the contents change their nature. The government becomes the possessor of them; and the unreflecting and unmoralized mind will, in spite of all you can do, regard them as an object of plunder. It is no longer an affair *between man and man.* From depredations of this sort; from becoming familiar with taking *what is not their own* in any situation, men naturally lose the horror of taking the property of their neighbour; and hence it is, and must be, the case, that a nation, in proportion as taxation, in the custom-house way, prevails, will be dishonest.——And, after all, who is it that *finally* suffer for this thieving? The *consumers* of West India produce; those who finally pay the taxes upon it. The planters occasionally suffer, because the thieving must fall partially; but it is those who consume that suffer in the end; and, when we sit down to the use of sugar or coffee, we may always say, that we are contributing towards the support of thieves; that, in earning the money to buy our breakfast, we have been labouring towards the maintenance of eight thousand thieves in London. And, if we can now say, that our earnings no longer go to the support of this horde of thieves, badged and unbadged, we cannot help remembering, that the expences of the Dock Establishment must fall upon our breakfasts; though, it must, on all hands, be confessed, that it is better to pay for the prevention, than for the encouragement, of theft.——In this view of the matter, without being dazzled by its stupendous mercantile exhibitions, and reserving, to their full extent, all my opinions, relating to the inutility of commerce, as a source of national wealth or strength, I cannot help expressing my pleasure at the establishment of the West India Dock system, and my hopes that it will proceed with uninterrupted success, in spite of the out-cries of eight thousand thieves and their interested abettors.

Botley, 26th January, 1809.

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WEST INDIA DOCKS.

AT A GENERAL COURT OF PROPRIETORS OF THE WEST-INDIA DOCK COMPANY, HELD AT THEIR HOUSE IN BILLITER-SQUARE, ON FRIDAY THE 6TH OF JANUARY, 1809, THOMAS HUGHAN, ESQ. IN THE CHAIR; THE CHAIRMAN READ TO THE MEETING A REPORT FROM A COMMITTEE OF DIRECTORS, ON THE GENERAL CONDUCT OF THE COMPANY'S CONCERNS, TO THE END OF THE YEAR 1808; WHICH WAS ORDERED TO BE PRINTED FOR THE USE OF THE PROPRIETORS.

REPORT.—*The Committee of Review, in compliance with the Resolution of the Court of Directors of the 28th December last, directing that they should "Report to the "Court the present state of business at the "Docks, and such circumstances respecting "the Company's Concerns during the last "Season, as may appear to them to require "observation," present the following Report.*

THE season just elapsed having been one of peculiar difficulty in the conduct of the Company's concerns, and in which the efficacy and resources of the Establishment have been called into action, and put to the test, it is matter of singular gratification to your Committee to be enabled to state, that the exertions of your officers and servants have been successful in the discharge of their duty; and that the business of the year, in all its various departments, although impeded by circumstances embarrassing and unprecedented, has been completed at a period unusually early. To the details which are necessarily connected with this (the more immediate) object of your Committee, they premise a few remarks, founded upon those facts and incontrovertible principles to which your Establishment owes both its origin and its utility.—However unwilling some persons may be to awaken the recollection, yet it cannot be generally forgotten, what were the excessive delays, increasing difficulties, and glaring abuses, which not many years ago obstructed, in an especial manner, the West-India Trade at this port, and called aloud for a remedy. The records exist which prove the enormity of the evil, progressively affecting the credit of the port, the safe collection of the revenue, and the property of individuals connected with the trade, in times otherwise prosperous, and seriously contributing to degrade and corrupt the morals of the people. To these causes your Establishment owes its origin; an effectual reform could only be sought in a great and costly effort. The individuals who formed and who composed the Company, undertook, at very considerable risk, to make the effort requisite for a purpose so desirable.—The obstacles that must occur in combating numerous and powerful classes of opponents determined by prejudice, or stimulated by interest, could only be surmounted by that union of zeal, perseverance, and ability, which were on this occasion combined, and being sanctioned by a provident policy in the legislature, (fortunately for the commercial prosperity of London,) proved successful. These opponents although silenced were not reconciled. To the origin and character of the Establishment itself, as opposed to individual and petty exactions, may be traced the source of much of that spirit of discontent and hostility which it has since encountered, and which has pursued its object, by misrepresentations, most gross, and yet too frequently credited; but it is a rigid enquiry into their conduct, and an impartial investigation of their principles and proceedings, that will furnish to the Company the surest means of vindicating themselves, and demonstrating, that they have, in all liberal construction, accomplished the good purposes of the undertaking, and fulfilled their engagements to the public.—By the general view of its merits and demerits, and not by its adaptation to any one particular occurrence, ought every public Establishment in fairness to be tried; but your Committee are confident that the Company need not shrink from a more minute scrutiny, and enquiry, how far its provisions and regulations are already compatible with the separate and distinct interests of different bodies connected with the West-India trade; although they may and will on the test of experiment, and by suggestions of those most interested, be ultimately still farther perfected.—The security afforded to property, and the prevention of frauds, are purposes which your institution is universally admitted to have attained, and in these objects, the interests of the public revenue, of the importers and proprietors of goods, and of the ship owners, are all intimately blended, and most essentially promoted; and yet these topics, of the highest importance to the state, and to individuals, (when clamour is to be excited against your system), are seldom adverted to, and although it would be no difficult task to prove that the duty saved to the revenue, and the property preserved to individuals, by these means, amounts annually to many hundred thousand pounds, yet your Committee abstain from a superfluous illustration of a fact so generally acknowledged, and proceed to details which are

more connected with some late discussions concerning the conduct of your Establishment.—If the Warehousing System be productive of great practical benefit both to internal and foreign commerce, it must not be overlooked, that so far as the West-India trade is concerned, it could not have been carried into effect, without some Establishment equivalent to that which thus originated. It is well known that during many years of his administration, the advantages that might result from that system both to the revenue and to the trade, had presented themselves to the comprehensive mind of that able minister, the late Mr. Pitt, and that he only suspended its adoption, until some adequate improvement should be made in the Port of London, under which it might be safely carried into effect. Your Establishment had hardly begun its operation before the provisions of that system were enacted by the legislature, the advantages of which, great as they are, have been necessarily attended by some additional delay and embarrassment to business, which the Company has endeavoured to meet with promptitude, and with the requisite additions to their Establishment.—The benefits accruing to the West-India body generally, and the degree of accommodation and dispatch afforded by the Company, your Committee conceive will be best illustrated by a few concise statements, as they are desirous that on disputed points an appeal may be made solely to the evidence of facts. They will here premise, that whatever advantages it shall appear have been obtained for the trade, are secured to it without any additional expence being incurred; the Company on its formation having undertaken for the term of their charter, to provide all the accommodation which the Dock System affords, and to perform all the services and labour necessary to ships and goods at importation, for the charges then current at the port, although such charges had been previously and almost annually advancing. —In order to shew how far the means and resources of the Company have been properly applied, and the dispatch given to ships, your Committee will first call the attention of the Court to an account, shewing the number of ships employed in the West-India trade which have been discharged in the Docks in the last six years, with the dates at which the business of each season appears to have been respectively completed.

Year.	No. of Ships.	Finished Landing.
1803	363	14 Jan. 1804
1804	354	29 Dec. 1804
1805	421	22 Jan. 1806
1806	477	2 Feb. 1807
1807	503	24 Dec. 1807
1808	598	593 completed 3 Dec. 1808

by which it will appear, that such has been the increase of the West-India trade, that 65 ships have been unloaded this season in addition to the greatest number ever before received, and 174 ships more than the average number of the preceding five years. In the period between the beginning of July and the beginning of December, a space of five months, when circumstances of the greatest difficulty occurred, upwards of 460 ships were unloaded, exclusive of smaller vessels and craft, with cargoes consisting of 159,804 hhds. and trs. of Sugar.—26,917 puns. and hhds., Rum. —31,675 hhds. and trs., 125,480 bags, Coffee.—10,855 bales, 487 pockets, &c. Cotton.—35 casks, 2732 bags, Pimento.—351 casks, 2,411 bags, Ginger.—822 casks, 7,228 bags, Cocoa.—1,797 casks, Wine. —Making a total of 11,342 bales, 137,851 bags, 221,401 casks, and from the 10th Oct. to the 28th Nov. 150 ships were entirely unloaded at the quays. This being the precise period when it was stated to the lords of the treasury, that owing to the negligence of the directors, only 8 or 9 ships were at that time unloaded weekly, and proceeding on that calculation, that 108 ships then in the docks would necessarily be delayed some months, (we must presume not less than three), and on such, and other equally unfounded pretexts, was grounded an application for an infringement of the Company's privileges. Whereas the fact is, that these 108 ships, with the addition of others subsequently admitted, were unloaded in the month of November, such only excepted as were delayed by causes not dependant on the Company.—The general state of the business performed by the Company during the last year will stand thus:—598 ships have been unloaded, and 106 smaller vessels and craft;—of the above number of 598 ships, 593 were completed upon the 3d Dec. 1808.—Thus so early as the close of the month of November, the great body of shipping in the West-India trade were completely cleared of their cargoes; an instance of dispatch singular and unexampled, and evidently proving the su-

periority of your Establishment, particularly under the embarrassing circumstances of an extraordinary accumulation of produce on hand, occasioned by an almost total stagnation of export: if these advantages be contrasted with the delays, impediments, losses, and abuses, which must have arisen under the former system, their value will be incalculable.—During the utmost pressure, and under peculiar circumstances of the season, the Company did undertake to provide at its own expence, and beyond its exclusive means, an extraordinary provision of warehouse room, but it did not become necessary to resort to it, beyond an accommodation for 5747 casks and 4137 boxes, and 511 barrels of prize or foreign sugar, and thus may the dispatch given to the shipping in such a season, afford the best proof of the adequacy of the Company's resources to the general exigencies of the trade; but it may be proper to add the following statement of the quantity of goods actually lodged within your warehouses at one time, exclusive of the articles on the quays:—102,647 hhds. and trs., 11,612 chests and brls. of Sugar.—14,681 puns. and hhds., Rum.—38,239 hhds. and trs., 190,408 bags, Coffee.—1,411 bales, 164 pockets, &c., Cotton.—24 casks, 3,168 bags, Piemento.—201 casks, 1,006 bags, Ginger.—1,100 casks, 13,257 bags, Cocoa.—1,786 casks, Wine.—Making a total of 11,612 chests, &c. 1,575 bales, 207,839 bags, 158,678 casks. Let this statement be compared with all the accommodation existing at the port, for the housing of West-India produce, previous to the formation of the docks, which according to the best computation in respect to the article of Sugar only, was not capable of containing beyond one third of the quantity, which has been actually deposited in your warehouses.—The system of providing distinctly for the shipping of goods to the West-Indies, and the security afforded thereby both to the ships and goods, belongs peculiarly to your Establishment; and, to a system so recent and dependant upon corresponding regulations of the revenue boards, it cannot reasonably be reproached that it is yet susceptible of improvement; sufficient however has appeared to shew that this part of your Establishment, is one, which must eventually prove of essential benefit to the West-India trade of the port.—The regulations of the Company have all been framed in strict consistency with its solid and permanent interests, by a constant and primary regard to the security of property, the interests of the revenue, and the accommodation of the trade, and not in any case directed by narrow views of present profit, in contradistinction to those more essential objects.—With the laws and regulations of the revenue departments it is necessary that the Company should co-operate, and sometimes it has been accused of disappointments, and delays, originating solely in that connexion. But in respect to that part of the system, over which your Directors have controul, they are ready at all times to adopt suggestions for improvement, whenever they shall be found upon attentive consideration to be compatible with the great objects of the institution.—The principles by which the Court of Directors have uniformly governed their conduct, have been those of sound discretion in the application of the funds of the Company, a liberal construction, and performance, of its engagements with the public, and a scrupulous impartiality in the administration of business.—How far these objects have been faithfully pursued, and successfully accomplished, may best be evinced: as to the first by the prosperous state of your finances; as to the second by the details furnished by, and the facts connected with this report; and, as to the last, it may fairly be demanded whether one single instance of deviation can be produced.

ENGLAND.——*King's Speech (by Commission) at the opening of the Session of Parliament, on the 19th January,* 1809.

MY LORDS AND GENTLEMEN, We are commanded by his Majesty to acquaint you, that he has assembled you together in the firm persuasion that you will concur with him in opinion that the only way of obtaining a safe and honourable peace, is by a vigorous prosecution of the war.—His Majesty has ordered to be laid before you the Copy of the Overtures made to him by France and Russia, from Erfurth, together with the Correspondence which ensued, and the Declaration of his Majesty's sentiments on that occasion.—His Majesty trusts you will participate in his feelings on rejecting overtures of peace, the preliminary condition of which was, to abandon the people of Spain in the struggle they are now making for their independence.—His Majesty has commanded us to express to you the satisfaction he felt at the brilliant commencement of the campaign which restored his ancient ally, but he had reason to regret the manner in which it was terminated by a Convention,

of several parts of which he had found it necessary to express his disapprobation.—His Majesty has lately renewed the assurances of support to the Spanish government, in support of their national independence, which he voluntarily gave at the commencement of the struggle they are now making, and which he has no doubt will terminate triumphantly, should they persevere in support of their legitimate sovereign, and should the nation be true to themselves.—The assurances his majesty has given to the Spanish government, have been reduced to a Treaty of friendship and alliance, which will be laid before you as soon as the ratifications have been exchanged.—His Majesty trusts you will enable him to continue his support of the king of Sweden in the struggle he is making, he having concurred with his Majesty in rejecting any overtures from the enemy, which had as a preliminary condition, the sacrifice of the Spanish nation.

Gentlemen of the House of Commons, His Majesty has ordered to be laid before you the estimates for the public service, and trusts you will provide him the means of carrying on the war with vigour.—His Majesty has the pleasure of assuring you that notwithstanding the exertions of the enemy to diminish our resources, the revenue continues to flourish to an extent the most satisfactory, and his Majesty believes that the contest may be carried on without any great or immediate addition to the burthens of his people.

My Lords and Gentlemen, His Majesty congratulates you on the complete success of the plan for establishing a Local Militia.—And his Majesty trusts you will take such steps for the increase of the regular army as may enable him to pursue the campaign with vigour, without weakening the means of defence at home.

Spanish Revolution.—*Proclamation issued in Mexico, 16th Sept.* 1808.

Inhabitants of Mexico, of all classes and conditions! Necessity is not subject to common laws. The city has seized the person of his excellency the Viceroy. His removal has been imperiously demanded by reasons of utility and general convenience. In the course of last night, the Royal Acuerdo, the most illustrious seignor, the Archbishop, and the other authorities, were convoked. They have submitted to the urgency of affairs; and the said Viceroy being divested of his authority, it has devolved, conformably to the royal order of the 30th Oct. 1808, upon field marshal D. Pedro Gariby, until the dispatches brought by the Providence shall have been opened. He is actually in possession of the supreme authority. Be calm and tranquil; you are now governed by an accredited chief, with whose prudence you are acquainted. Confide in the vigilance of the Royal Acuerdo; all will turn out to your advantage. Impatience can only serve to divide men's minds, and to occasion mischiefs which may perhaps be irremediable. The said provisional chief, the Royal Acuerdo, and the other concurring authorities, give you every assurance that can be wished for.—By command of his excellency, the President, with the Royal Acuerdo, the most illustrious seignor Archbishop, and the other Authorities.—Francisco Ximenez.

Dispatch from the General in chief of the Army of Catalonia, to the Minister at War, 27th Nov. 1808.

Most excellent seignor—According to the intention, of which I apprised your excellency in my dispatch of the 29th ult. the general attack took place yesterday on all the posts occupied by the enemy without the limits of Barcelona, from all of which he was immediately dislodged, and compelled to take refuge under the guns of the fortress, with the exception of the advantageous position of St. Pedro Martir which is the most commanding. The communication with this post being completely cut off, in consequence of our line being advanced to Hospitalet, Esplugas, Sarria, Gracia, and Horta, as your excellency will perceive from the plan which I have the honour to send you, I, upon this ground, summoned the commandant to surrender. He refused compliance, and I immediately gave orders for an attack; but at half past 12 o'clock this day he surrendered himself and his garrison prisoners of war, consisting of 104 privates and two officers. We found in the place four 4-pounders and one 2-pounder, with magazines of ammunition and stores. At the same time a firing was commenced from the right and centre of our line, and the enemy were repulsed as far as the walls of Barcelona, from which it will not now be an easy task for them to advance again. I now (four in the afternoon) forward this to your excellency in the mean time by a special messenger, for the satisfaction of his Majesty, until, by receiving the statements of the generals and commanders of columns, I shall be enabled to transmit to your excellency the details of the operations of

these two days.—Our line occupies the above-mentioned posts, and I have fixed the head-quarters of the army in this town, which is about a league's distance from it, &c. &c. JUAN MIGUEL DE VIVES.

O'Neill's Report to Palafox respecting the battle of Tudela, 8 Dec. 1808.

"IN consequence of the actual situation of this city, threatened with a siege by the enemy, it has been until now found impossible to lay before the public an official account of the details of the attack and obstinate battle fought at Tudela on the 23rd ult.; a battle equally fatal and glorious to this army, which, supported only by its own strength and its own valour, maintained the contest for eight hours in the midst of the most dreadful fire. It is impossible to convey an adequate idea of the number of heroic achievements performed by the officers and soldiers, whilst one-half of the army was defending their posts with discharges of musketry, and the other were maintaining the contest with the bayonet, until the number of the slain on both sides left scarcely room for action, and both the contending armies retired.—The captain-general of this excellent army of reserve has received the following detailed dispatch from lieut.-gen. Don Juan O'Neil, who commanded the troops in the engagement, from Illucca, whither he retired with field marshal D. Felippe St. March.—Most excellent seignor; A few hours after my conference with your excellency at Caperoso, respecting the good condition of the troops under my command, at that most important point, full of ardour and enthusiasm, from the superiority which they conceived themselves to possess over the enemy, who for so long a period had not dared to attack us, and from advantages of greater magnitude which they anticipated in the direction of Pampeluna; and when your excellency, convinced of the necessity of not permitting a favourable opportunity to pass, for executing designs in which I cordially concurred, proceeded to consult with the captain-general of the army of the centre, I received a dispatch from the captain-general of the army of the centre, and the representative of the supreme central Junta, D. Francisco Palafox, dated the 21st inst. informing me of the extreme urgency that all my troops should immediately put themselves in motion, and proceed by way of Tudela, to the right of the line, which was to be formed upon Cascante and Tarragona, as far as the heights of Moncayo; and charging me not to lose a moment, since they had given orders for the march of the army of the centre, and were on the point of attacking and defeating the enemy, in order to save that army; an object, the attainment of which would be of the greatest importance for Spain, and totally disconcert the plans of the enemy.—Surprised at the novelty of this dispatch, so completely at variance with the plan we had agreed upon at Caparoeo the day before, I sent to inform your excellency, and before I received your answer, your dispatch, dated at Tudela on the same day (the 21st), reached me, directing, that in consequence of what the captain-general of the centre had stated to you, I should, the instant I received it, march with the whole of my army, and the troops belonging to the centre attached to it, for Tudela, there to fix my head-quarters, it being understood that the troops that occupied the posts of Cintriunego, Calahorra, and the other parts of the Ebro, were already on their march for Borja and Tarrazona, and consequently that any delay might be very injurious, and expose the army to be turned in that quarter. On the same day, as my troops were just setting off, I received your excellency's answer, confirming your previous order, in consequence of the army of the centre having already commenced its movement.—I cannot describe to your excellency the sensation felt by the troops under my command, in consequence of this retrogade movement, as all of them, previously animated by the preceding fortunate movements, found all their hopes frustrated, and saw themselves removed from the advanced situation that they always occupied in front of the enemy. An event so unexpected disheartened them; and in order to inspire them with the same degree of ardour which they had hitherto manifested, and to prevent the fatal consequences of which I was apprehensive, I exerted my authority, accompanying it with the most energetic persuasion, and shewing them the order of that evening, according to which the safety of the whole army depended upon our retrogade movement, and in short, telling them that it was the result of the express orders of your excellency, and must be obeyed.—This representation, in some degree, tranquillized them, and I proceeded with my troops to Tudela, where your excellency, the seignor representative, and the captain general of the army of the centre, were already arrived. At nine in the morning of the following day (23d),

col. Don F. Perena sent to inform me, that two columns of the enemy were deploying in front of Ablitas. In consequence of this intelligence, and the captain-general of the army of the centre having, the preceding evening, informed me, that the enemy had entered Cintrinnego, I ordered the generale to be beaten, apprising, at the same time, the captain-general, that as commander in chief, he might make the necessary dispositions. He ordered some reinforcements to advance, and soon after caused gen. St. March to do the same on the left, sending various corps of my division to the heights of Santa Barbara, to reinforce that important point, and to support the troops already occupying it belonging to the division of general Rova. As he left me on the high road with the remainder of my troops, I sent to him my aid-de-camp, D. B. Gelabert, to ascertain what I was to do, as the engagement was already begun. His answer was, that I should proceed to the centre of the line, where he was posted. Soon after, he ordered the remainder of the troops to join him, and he assigned me the command of the whole of the left wing. When I arrived, I found the heights on the left already occupied by the enemy, who threatened to turn us; but having received his order to attack them, and an assurance that the division of gen. La Pena would advance to my assistance, I determined to execute the attack by echellons of battalions. The battalion of the royal Spanish guards commenced it with such unexampled gallantry, that the enemy instantly abandoned that important post, leaving the field of battle covered with dead bodies. The same success attended the attack in front, by the regiments of the volunteers of Castile and Segorbia. While I was indulging in the satisfaction produced by our success, and considering the battle gained, two orderly officers of cavalry came to desire me, on the part of the captain-general, not to be alarmed by the appearance of a column of infantry, with a considerable body of cavalry, who were advancing on the left, as they were the troops of general la Pena coming from Cascante. Congratulating myself upon this aid, which would have decided the battle in our favour, I rode along my left to direct general St. March to continue the attack in the same order, when that general surprised me by telling me it was necessary we should retreat, as our right had been forced, that the enemy were in Tudela, and that all the troops that occupied the centre of one position had retreated. This intelligence astonished me the more, as the captain-general had sent me no information of this event, a circumstance which appeared to me impossible; but a firing being heard in the rear of the olive plantations, I was convinced of the fact. In this melancholy situation, the division of general la Pena not having moved, and that which was announced as his division proving to be a corps of the enemy, of about 8000 infantry, and 2000 cavalry, I gave directions for retreating in the best possible order; placing the 2d regiment of Valencia in an oblique position to cover the retreat of our troops. The troops were surrounded on all sides, but they gallantly cut their way with the bayonet. I put myself at their head, and left gen. St. March, with the cavalry to protect this daring and only resource that was left to us. The general discharged this trust with the same exactness that he did every other duty confided to him during the action. I can assure your excellency, that I never witnessed an occasion in which all the officers and soldiers more completely performed their duty; but of those who were under my orders, I ought to make particular mention of the third battalion of the royal Spanish guards, and the regiments of Castile, Segorbia, and Turia. D. M. Velasco, commander of the artillery of my division; D. A. Ulloa, commander of general St. March's; D. J. Monino; D. R. del Pino, who though surrounded by the enemy, spiked a part of the artillery which they could not bring off, are very much entitled to consideration for having entirely destroyed three columns of the enemy.—The enemy's loss cannot be less than 8,000 men, as we may assure ourselves, when they admitted it exceeded 4,000. I have not yet received all the returns of the loss on our side, but I doubt whether it amounts to 2000 in killed, wounded, and missing. I have the satisfaction of having saved half of the artillery, which was brought off by routes almost impracticable, and of having been a near spectator of every thing that passed to the last moment. I can assure you, that in this unfortunate event all those under my command have done their duty to their king and country; and that had the captain-general ordered the army of the centre to support us, it would, beyond all doubt, have been the most glorious day for his majesty's arms, of any recorded in the history of this war.

Palafox's Dispatch to the Central Junta.—*Dec.* 3, 1808.

SEIGNOR: This capital has recently given an additional proof of that heroic patriotism and attachment to its sovereign which distinguish and characterise it. On the 30th of Nov. in the dusk of the evening, the enemy, being above 12,000 men in number, made their appearance in the quarter of Torrero and Casa Blanca, having come by Muel and Muria, on the roads from Madrid and Valencia. Part of them took post on the road, on a height situated between the hermitages of Soledad and Santa Barbara, and commanding La Casa Blanca; the rest ascended, under cover of the Ravine de la Muerre which covers Torrero, and took possession of the Carthusian monastery of Conception. They had a considerable body at Alagon, and we were informed that 3000 men were advancing by way of Tauste and Castejon de Baldejussa a Zuera, in order to attack us at four points. The whole of the garrison were immediately ordered under arms, and the heroes of Saragossa also took up their muskets. All the posts were occupied, and the whole of the inhabitants went out with alacrity and enthusiasm to be spectators of the glorious action which was impending. On the 1st of Dec. at day-break, the enemy were dislodged from the Carthusian monastery, and compelled to fall back through the Ravine, when they took post in five columns on the heights that command Torrero, with the decided intention of making their attack in that quarter. They manœuvred until 10 o'clock a. m. at which hour they commenced their most decisive and vigorous attack in the direction of Casa Blanca. It was received on our side with a very brisk fire of musketry and cannon, which lasted until two o'clock, when the whole of the enemy's army in Soledad fell back, shamefully abandoning Torrero.

(To be continued.)

AMERICAN STATES.—*Letter from Mr. Giles, Member of the Embargo Committee, to Mr. Gullatin, Sec. of the Treasury, dated 11th Nov.* 1808.

DEAR SIR.—I am instructed by the Committee appointed to consider the several Embargo Laws, &c. to request you to lay before them with as little delay as possible, such information as your department affords upon the following questions.—First, What measures would be most effectual in preventing the violations or evasions of the several Embargo Laws; and enforcing due observance thereof?—Second, Can any of the inconveniences of the present system be remedied by further modifications; and what modifications would effect that object? Be pleased, Sir, to accept assurances of my high consideration and regard.

Letter from Mr. Gullatin, in Answer to Mr. Giles. Dated, 21st, Nov. 1808.

SIR—Indisposition has prevented an earlier answer to your letter of the 14th inst.—For better preventing coasting vessels regularly cleared from violating the Embargo, two measures appear necessary: —1st. That the amount of the Bonds should be increased.—2dly. That neither capture, distress, or any other accident should be admitted as a plea, or be given in evidence on trial.—By the first regulation the temptation of going to a foreign port, in hopes that the profit on the sale of the cargo will indemnify for the forfeiture of the penalty, will be done away, By the second, every expectation of escaping the payment of the penalty under fraudulent pretences will be disappointed; and the power of remitting the penalties in the few cases of unavoidable accident which may occur, will remain as heretofore, and as in other cases, with the treasury.—As the object of those two regulations will be to make the bond a sufficient and complete security, they will have a tendency to relieve, in a considerable degree, the coasting trade from the inconvenience resulting from detentions. The sufficiency of the bond will in many doubtful cases remove the necessity of detaining the vessels, or what amounts to the same, of informing the owners that unless they reduce the amount of their cargoes they will be detained.—I would also submit the propriety of placing under the controul of the President, that power of detention vested in the collectors by the act of the 25th of April last. That subject has been a constant source of complaint and difficulty. It has been the uniform practice from the establishment of the government of the United States, to give positive instructions to the collectors respecting the execution of the laws, and which they were bound to obey, unless a different construction should be established by a legal decision. This indeed was essentially necessary, in order to secure an uniform construction and execution of the laws. But the provision now alluded to makes the detention to rest on the opinion of each collector, and this must necessarily produce a great diversity in

the manner in which the power should be executed. All has been done that can be done to obviate that evil; and the President being authorised to decide on the detentions when made, the opportunity was taken to inform the collectors of what in his opinion should be a proper cause of detention. This however could be given only as opinion, and operate as a recommendation, and not as an order. Nor does it appear practicable to establish uniformity, and to prevent partiality, and either laxity or too great severity in practice, unless the power of prescribing general rules in that respect by which the collectors will be bound to abide, be vested in the President.—I am aware that there is another mode of evasion, by regular coasting vessels, which will not be prevented by either of the preceding provisions. Either whilst in port or on their way down our rivers and bays, coasting vessels may receive articles not entered on their manifest, which they put on board other vessels lying off the coast for that purpose.—But it is not perceived that any legal provision can prevent that infraction, nor that any other remedy can be found than the vigilance of the officers. Another general regulation will, however, be suggested perhaps useful as a permanent measure, but which would at all events, under existing circumstances, give additional security for the observance of the laws, and afford some relief to our own seamen; to wit, a prohibition to employ any aliens either as masters or part of the crew of any coasting vessel.—It is still more difficult to guard against violations by vessels departing without clearance, in open defiance of the laws. The following provisions, on mature consideration, appear the most efficient that can be devised against infractions which it is the more necessary to repress as they may be daily expected to increase, and threaten to prostrate the law and government itself.—1st. To forbid expressly under pain of forfeiture (the penalty now being only implied) the lading of any vessel without the permission of the collector, and without the bond for a coasting voyage being previously given;—authorising the collectors to refuse permission, unless the object be that of a lawful coasting or fishing voyage. The great number of vessels now laden and in a state of readiness to depart shews the necessity of this provision. If there be cases in which the indulgences of converting vessels into warehouses, ought to be granted, there will be no hardship, where the intention is fair, to require a bond similar to that given for a coasting voyage. And the collectors should likewise in such cases be expressly authorised to take such efficient precautions as will put it out of the power of such vessels to sail without warning.—2. In order to prevent those fraudulent sales of vessels by which ostensible owners of no responsibility are substituted to those from whom penalties might be recovered, it is necessary to provide that those owners of vessels whose names appear on the register or licence, should continue to be reputed as such, and liable to the penalties in case of infraction of the laws, until the register or licence shall have been actually surrendered and new papers shall have been regularly granted by the collector to the purchaser, and in every such case, of purchase, a sufficient bond that the embargo shall not be infringed, to be previously required.—3. The power to seize unusual deposits now vested in the collectors of districts adjacent to the territories of foreign nations should, as well contemplated in the Bill passed by the House of Representatives, be extended to all the districts.—That this is an arbitrary power which nothing but the unremitted efforts in some places to evade the law can publicly justify, cannot be denied; and it should, like that of detention, be placed under the controul of the President, and be executed only in conformity with such general rules as he would prescribe.—4. Exclusively of the assistance which may be derived from gun-boats and from the armed vessels of the United States, it would be advisable to authorise the President to add ten or twelve cutters to the present establishment. Fast sailing vessels of every draft of water, and requiring only from 15 to 30 men each, are mostly wanted, and would, for the object contemplated, be as useful as the largest frigates.—5. It is with regret that the necessity of authorising, on the application of the collectors, an immediate call of the local physical force of the country, must also be stated. But such partial acts of violence as have taken place in some of the seaports, cannot be prevented by the circuitous manner in which the public force must now be brought out in support of the laws. And no doubt exists that the mass of the citizens, whether they approve or disapprove of the Embargo, would in every port instantaneously suppress any such outrage, they can be called upon to act in a legal manner.

SUPPLEMENT to No. 4, VOL. XV.—Price 10d.

—Some other provisions appear also necessary for the purpose of carrying the laws more completely into effect along our land frontiers.—1. The exportation of specie by land should be expressly prohibited.—2. The power of detaining deposits should be so expressed as to leave no doubt of the authority to detain waggons and other carriages laden and actually on their way to a foreign territory. Although I cannot perceive any reason for the distinction, it has been supposed in one of the districts, that the law which authorised the detention of flour, beef, or potash deposited in a warehouse, did not extend to the case of their being deposited in a waggon although evidently on its way to Canada.—3. The offence now published by law is that of exportation. This is not consummated till after the property has been actually carried beyond the lines, where being in a foreign jurisdiction, it cannot be seized: so that forfeiture, which is the most efficient penalty, can never apply to exportations by land; and the bond being required, as in the case of vessels, the only remedy is the uncertain one of recovering penalties against apparent offenders who either abscond or have no property. How far it may be practicable to make the act of preparing the means of exportation punishable, or provide some other remedy, is submitted to the Committee.—But it must also be observed, that every degree of opposition to the laws, which falls short of treason, is now with but few exceptions, an offence undefined and unprovided for by the laws of the United States. Whence it follows that such offences remain unpunished when the state authorities do not interfere. The necessity of defining those offences by law as misdemeanors, and of providing an adequate punishment, appears obvious.—I will beg leave here to add that it does not appear necessary to continue any longer the indulgence granted to the British merchants to import for the use of the Indians articles of which the importation is generally prohibited by law, as that privilege is liable to great abuse, and affords just ground of dissatisfaction to American citizens.—Whether it be adviseable to continue the permission given to those Indian traders to export furs and peltry, is a question to be decided by political considerations.—The last branch of the subject to which I wish at present to call the attention of the committee, relates to interruptions and certain injurious proceedings attempted under colour of law.—1. Vexatious suits are brought against collectors, which not only perplex faithful officers, but have the effect of intimidating others, and prevent an energetic performance of their duties. The only provisions which have occurred to me on the subject, are to enable the collectors who may be sued, always to remove the cause before a court of the United States; to make a certificate issued by the proper authority, that there was reasonable cause of detention, protect them against damages in cases of detentions, in the same manner as is now provided in cases of seizures; and to provide for the safe keeping, and restoring when proper, and on security being given, the vessels and property which may be detained.—2. Attempts have in several instances been made to wrest from the collectors by writs of replevin issued by the state courts or officers, property detained or seized by said collectors, or which, in any other manner, is in their possession in conformity with some law of the United States. It is evident that such attempts, if submitted to, would defeat not only the embargo but also the revenue laws of the United States; that whenever property is by virtue of the law of the United States in the possession of a collector, marshal, or any other of their officers, no process *in rem*, which will take the property away, whether of replevin, attachment, or any other, can be legally issued by a state authority; and that the sheriff or other person executing the same must be considered as a mere trespasser, and be resisted accordingly. But there is no other way at present to resist such illegal process but actual force. And it appears necessary that another remedy should be afforded, by providing a summary mode of superseding any such process, through the interference of the courts of justice of the United States; and by making it penal for any sheriff, or other person, to execute the same, or in any manner to attempt to take property which by virtue of any law of the United States is in the collector's possession.—3. In some instances where vessels and cargoes libelled for infractions of the embargo have been restored to their owners on their giving security for the appraised value, the valuations have been so low as to reduce the forfeiture to an inconsiderable sum, thereby defeating altogether the law. It is suggested that this might be prevented by a provision authorising and directing the district judges to set aside on motion of the district attorney, such valuation, whenever in their opinion falling short of the true value.—On the

subject of *mandamus*, I will only observe that, in the only instance which has taken place, the court, supposing they had jurisdiction, could not, from the manner in which the question was brought before them, having decided otherwise than they did, but that it is desirable that the question of jurisdiction, as it relates either to the courts in whom the power ought to be vested, or to the courts to which it should extend, should be precisely defined by law.—I have not in this communication taken into consideration the technical defects of the existing embargo laws, because prosecutions do not fall within my immediate cognizance, and I do not feel competent to the task of pointing out the necessary alterations. Measures have however been taken to procure on that subject and from the proper sources, information which will hereafter be laid before the committee.—To the remaining enquiry of the committee, whether the inconveniences of the present system may not in some degree be removed, I can only answer, generally, that a law which lays such extensive restrictions as the embargo, cannot be carried into effect without imposing serious inconveniencies even on the domestic intercourse of the United States; and that these must necessarily be increased in proportion to the opposition and efforts to evade or violate the law. It has already been stated that provisions which will render the bond given by coasting vessels a complete security against violations of them, will diminish the necessity and extent of more arbitrary restrictions. An authority to permit on proper security being given such vessels when they arrive in port, to keep their cargoes on board, would afford some relief. And I think that the credit on duties accruing on the importation of some articles which was allowed by the act of 10th March last, should be extended to all importations of the same articles made after the passing of the act, those made in vessels which sailed under special permission only excepted. With respect to this last class of importations, as they were permitted by special indulgence, as it is understood that it has been impossible in many cases to prevent its being abused, and as in almost all the parties having a species of exclusive privilege, have made sufficiently profitable voyages, the propriety, particularly in the existing situation of the revenue, of allowing them also the advantages of an extended credit on duties, is not perceived.

Report of the Embargo Committee.

After a period of 15 years of peace hardly interrupted by transient hostilities, and of prosperity unparalleled in the history of nations; the United States are, for the first time since the treaty which terminated the revolutionary war, placed in a situation equally difficult, critical and dangerous.—Those principles recognized by the civilized world under the name of Law of Nations, which heretofore controuled belligerent powers, regulated the duties of neutrals, and protected their rights, are now avowedly disregarded or forgotten by Great Britain and France. Each of those two nations captures and condemns all American vessels trading with her enemies or her enemy's allies, and every European power having become a party in the contest, the whole of our commerce with Europe and European colonies, becomes liable to capture by either one or the other. If there be any nominal exception, it is made on a condition of tribute, which only adds insult to the injury.—The only plea urged in justification of those hostilities, is that of retaliation, grounded on a presumed acquiescence of the United States in previous aggressions by the other party. Waving a discussion of the correctness of the principle of retaliation, a principle doubtful in itself and altogether inadmisisble to the extent to which it has been carried, and when operating on the neutral rather than on the enemy: it is altogether untrue that the United States have voluntarily acquiesced in the unlawful aggressions of either nation; omitted or delayed any measures calculated to obtain redress, or in any respect deviated from that impartiality to which they were bound by their neutrality. France has alluded to the violations of the national flag, and of the sovereignty of the United States, in the instances of Pierce's murder, of the outrage on the Chesapeake, and of the destruction of the Impetuous. The measures taken to obtain redress in those cases are of public notoriety, and it may be added, that with the exception of the last, those aggressions on the sovereignty of the United States did not affect their neutrality, and gave no right to France either of complaint or interference. Setting aside irregularities of less importance, and equally chargeable to both nations, such as the British order of June 1803, and the decree of the French general Ferrand; the principal violations by England of the neutral rights of America, prior to the Berlin decree of November

1806, and which if acquiesced in might have given grounds of complaint to France, are the capture of American vessels laden with colonial produce, founded on a renewal of that pretended principle generally called "the Rule of 1756," the impressment of American seamen, compelled thereby to become the auxiliaries of England against France, and proclamation of nominal blockades, particularly that of the coast from the river Elbe to Brest notified in May 1806.—It will not be asserted that the United States have ever tamely acquiesced in either of those pretensions. It will not be denied, that with respect to the two first, the most strenuous efforts were incessantly made to procure an alteration of the British system.—It is true that to the nominal proclamation blockades of England, the United States had opposed only spirited and repeated remonstrances, and that these had not always been successful. But the measures which a neutral nation may be supposed bound to take against the infractions of its neutrality, must always bear a certain proportion to the extent and nature of the injury received, and to the means of opposition. It cannot certainly be pretended that a hasty resort to war, should in every such instance have become the duty of America. Nor can the irregularities of England, in declaring in a state of blockade, a certain extent of coast, part of which was not and the whole of which could not, even by her powerful navy, be actually invested and blockaded, be pleaded in justification of that decree, by which France, without an efficient fleet, pretends to announce the blockade of the dominions of a power which has the incontestible command of the sea, and before no port of which she can station a single vessel.—The Milan decree of 1807 can still less rest for its defence on the supposed acquiescence of the United States in the British orders of the preceding month, since those orders which have not certainly been acquiesced in, were not even known in America at the date of the decree. And it is proper here to add, that the French have, particularly by the sequestration of certain vessels in their ports, and by burning our ships on the high seas, gone even beyond the tenor of their own extraordinary edicts.—The allegation of an acquiescence in the Berlin decree of November 1806, by which alone the British government pretends to justify the orders in council, is equally unfounded. In the note on that subject addressed on the 31st Dec. 1806, by the British government to the American ministers, after having stated that "they could not believe that the enemy would ever seriously attempt to enforce such a system," the following declaration is expressly made, "If, however, the enemy should carry these threats into execution, and if neutral nations, contrary to all expectation, should acquiesce in such usurpations, his Majesty might probably be compelled, however reluctantly, to retaliate in his just defence, &c." The two requisites necessary in the opinion of Great Britain to justify retaliation, are stated to be the execution of the decree, and the acquiescence of neutral nations. Yet, within eight days after, and in the face of that Declaration, without waiting for ascertaining either of those facts, the retaliating British order of January 7, 1807, was issued, which, contrary to the acknowledged law of nations, subjected to capture, vessels of the United States sailing from the port of one belligerent to a port of another belligerent.—The United States in the mean while and without delay, had taken the necessary steps to ascertain the manner in which the French government intended to execute their decree.—That decree might be construed merely as a municipal law forbidding the introduction of British merchandize, and the admission of vessels coming from England. Under that aspect, and if confined to that object, the neutral rights of America were not affected by its operation.—A belligerent may, without any infraction of neutral rights, forbid the admission into his ports of any vessel coming from the ports of his enemy. And France had undoubtedly the same right to exclude from her dominions every species of British merchandize, which the United States have exercised in forbidding the importation of certain species. Great Britain might be injured by such regulations: but America had no more right to complain of that part of the decree, than France had to object to the American Non-importation Act. So far indeed as respects the United States, they were placed by the municipal part of the decree in the same situation, in relation to France, in which they are placed in their intercourse with Great Britain by the permanent laws of that country. The French decree forbids American vessels to import British merchandize into France. The British Navigation Act forbids American vessels to import French merchandize into England. But that broad clause of the Berlin decree which declared the British islands in a state of blockade, though not followed by regulations to that ef-

fect, still threatened an intended operation on the high seas. This if carried into effect, would be a flagrant violation of the neutral rights of the United States, and as such they would be bound to oppose it. The minister of the United States at Paris immediately applied for explanation on that subject; and the French minister of marine, on the 24th Dec. 1806, seven days before the date of the abovementioned note of the British government, stated in answer, that the decree made no alteration in the regulations then observed in France with regard to neutral navigation, or to the commercial convention of the United States with France. That the declaration of the British islands being in a state of blockade, did not change the existing French laws concerning maritime captures, and that American vessels could not be taken at sea for the mere reason of their being going to or returning from an English port.—The execution of the decree comported for several months with those explanations; several vessels were arrested for having introduced articles of English growth or manufacture, and among them some which being actually from England, and laden with English colonial produce, had entered with forged papers as if coming from the United States. But no alteration of the first construction given by the French government took place until the month of September, 1807. The first condemnation on the principle that the decree subjected neutral vessels to capture on the high seas, was that of the Horizon, on the 10th of October following.—Prior to that time there could have been no acquiescence in a decree infringing the neutral rights of the United States, because till that time it was explained, and what was more important, executed in such a manner as not to infringe those rights, because until then no such infraction had taken place. The ministers of the United States at London, at the request of the British minister, communicated to him on the 18th of October, 1807, the substance of the explanations received, and of the manner in which the decree was executed. For they were at that time ignorant of the change which had taken place.—It was on the 18th of September, 1807, that a new construction of the decree took place; an instruction having on that day been transmitted to the council of prizes by the minister of justice, by which that court was informed, that French armed vessels were authorized, under that decree, to seize, without exception, in neutral vessels, either English property or merchandize of English growth or manufacture.—An immediate explanation having been asked from the French minister of foreign relations, he confirmed, in his answer of the 7th of October, 1807, the determination of his government to adopt that construction. Its first application took place on the 10th of the same month, in the case of the Horizon, of which the minister of the United States was not informed until the month of November; and on the 12th of that month, he presented a spirited remonstrance against that infraction of the neutral rights of the United States. He had, in the meanwhile, transmitted to America the instruction to the council of prizes of the 18th of September. This was received on the of December: and a copy of the decision in the case of the Horizon, having at the same time reached government, the president, aware of the consequences which would follow that new state of things, communicated immediately to Congress the alteration of the French decrees, and recommended the embargo, which was accordingly laid on the 22d of December, 1807; at which time it was well understood, in this country, that the British orders in council of November preceding had issued, although they were not officially communicated to our government.—On the 11th of that month, those orders did actually issue, declaring that all the ports of France, of her Allies, and of any other country at war with England, and all other ports of Europe, from which, although not at war with England, the British flag was excluded, should thenceforth be considered as if the same were actually blockaded—that all trade in articles of the produce or manufacture of the said countries should be deemed unlawful; and that every vessel trading from or to the said countries, together with all goods and merchandize on board, and also all articles of the produce or manufacture of the said countries, should be liable to capture and condemnation—These orders cannot be defended on the ground of their being intended as retaliating on account of the Berlin decree, as construed, and uniformly executed from its date to the 18th of September 1807, its construction and execution having till then infringed no neutral rights. For certainly, the monstrous doctrine will not be asserted, even by the British government, that neutral nations are bound to resist not only the acts of belligerent powers which violate their rights, but also those municipal regulations, which, how-

ever they may injure the enemy, are lawful and do not affect the legitimate rights of the neutral. The only retaliation to be used in such cases, must be such as will operate on the enemy without infringing the rights of the neutral. If solely intended as a retaliation on the Berlin decree, as executed prior to the month of September, the British orders in council should have been confined to forbidding the introduction into Great Britain, of French or enemy's merchandize, and the admission into British ports of neutral vessels, coming from a French or other enemy's port. Indeed, the ground of retaliation on account of any culpable acquiescence of neutrals in decrees, violating their rights, is abandoned by the very tenor of the orders; their operation being extended to those countries from which the British flag was excluded, such as Austria, although such countries were neither at war with Great Britain, nor had passed any decree in any way affecting or connected with neutral rights.—Nor are the orders justifiable on the pretence of an acquiescence on the part of the United States, in the French decree as construed and executed subsequent to the 18th Sept. 1807, when it became an evident infraction of their rights, and such as they were bound to oppose. For their minister at Paris immediately made the necessary remonstrances, and the orders were issued not only without having ascertained whether the United States would acquiesce in the injurious alteration of the French decree, but more than one month before that alteration was known in America. It may even be asserted that the alteration was not known in England when the orders in council were issued; the instruction of the 18th September, 1807, which gave the new and injurious construction, not having been promulgated in France, and its first publication having been made in December, 1807, and by the American government itself.—The British orders in council are, therefore, unjustifiable on the principle of retaliation, even giving to that principle all the latitude which has ever been avowedly contended for.—They are in open violation of the solemn declaration made by the British ministers in December, 1806; that retaliation on the part of Great Britain would depend on the execution of an unlawful decree, and on the acquiescence of neutral nations in such infraction of their rights. And they were also issued, notwithstanding the official communication made by the ministers of the United States, that the French decree was construed and executed so as not to infringe their neutral rights, and without any previous notice or intimation, denying the correctness of that statement.—The Berlin Decree as expounded and executed subsequent to the 18th September, 1807, and the British orders in council of the 11th November ensuing, are, therefore, as they affect the United States, cotemporaneous aggressions of the belligerent powers, equally unprovoked and equally indefensible on the presumed ground of acquiescence. These, together with the Milan decree of December, 1807, which filled the measure, would on the principle of self-defence have justified immediate hostilities against both nations on the part of the United States. They thought it more eligible in the first instance by withdrawing their vessels from the ocean, to avoid war, at least, for a season, and at the same time, to snatch their immense and defenceless commerce from impending destruction.—Another appeal has in the mean time been made, under the authority vested in the President for that purpose, to the justice and true interests of France and England. The propositions made by the United States and the arguments urged by their ministers are before Congress. By these, the very pretext of the illegal edicts was removed, and it is evident that a revocation by either nation on the ground on which it was asked, either must have produced, what both pretended to have in view, a restoration of the freedom of commerce, and of the acknowledged principles of the law of nations; or in case of refusal by the other belligerent, would have carried into effect, in the most efficient manner, the ostensible object of the edicts, and made the United States a party in the war against him. The effort has been ineffectual.—The propositions have been actually rejected by one of the Belligerent powers, and remain unanswered by the other. In that state of things, what course ought the United States to pursue? Your committee can perceive no other alternative, but abject and degrading submission; war with both nations; or a continuance and enforcement of the present suspension of commerce.—The first cannot require any discussion. But the pressure of the embargo, so sensibly felt, and the calamities inseparable from a state of war, naturally create a wish that some middle course might be discovered, which should avoid the evils of both, and not be inconsistent with national honour and independance. That illusion must be dissipated; and it is

necessary that the people of the United States should fully understand the situation in which they are placed.—There is no other alternative, but war with both nations, or a continuance of the present system. For war with one of the belligerents only would be submission to the edicts and will of the other; and a repeal in whole or in part of the embargo must necessarily be war or submission.—A general repeal without arming, would be submission to both nations.—A general repeal and arming of our merchant vessels, would be war with both, and war of the worst kind, suffering the enemies to plunder us without retaliation upon them.—A partial repeal must, from the situation of Europe necessarily be actual submission to one of the aggressors, and war with the other.—The last position, is the only one on which there can be any doubt; and it will be most satisfactorily demonstrated by selecting amongst the several modifications, which might be suggested, which that may on first view appear the least exceptionable; a proposition to repeal the embargo, so far only as relates to those powers, which have not or do not execute any decrees injurious to the neutral rights of the United States.—It is said that the adoption of that proposition would restore our commerce with the native powers of Asia and Africa, and with Spain, Portugal, Sweden and Russia. Let this be taken for granted, although the precise line of conduct now pursued by most of those nations, in relation to the United States, is not correctly ascertained. So far as relates to any advantages which would result from that measure, if confined to its ostensible object, it will be sufficient to observe, that the exports of articles of the domestic produce of the United States, during the year ending the 30th September 1807, amounted to 43,700,000, and that the portion exported to the countries above enumerated falls short of seven millions; an amount too inconsiderable, when compared with the bulk of our exports, to deserve attention, even if a question affecting the independence of the nation was to be decided by considerations of immediate profit.—But the true effect of the proposition would be to open an indirect trade with Great Britain, which, through St. Bartholomew and Havannah, Lisbon, Cadiz or Gottenburg, would receive, at prices reduced by glutted markets, and for want of competition, all the provisions, naval stores, raw materials for her manufactures, and other articles which she may want. Whether she would be satisfied with that favourable state of things, or whether, considering that boon as a pledge of unqualified submission, she would, according to the tenor of her orders, interrupt our scanty commerce with Russia, and occasionally under some new pretext, capture rather than purchase the cargoes intended for her own use, is equally uncertain and unimportant. Nor can it be doubted that a measure which would supply, exclusively, one of the belligerents, would be war with the other. Considered merely as a question of profit, it would be much more eligible, at once to raise the embargo in relation to Great Britain, as we would then, at least, have the advantages of a direct market with the consumer. But the proposition can only be defended on the ground that France is the only aggressor, and, that having no just reason to complain of England, it is our duty to submit to her orders. On that inadmissible supposition, it would not only be more candid, but also more dignified, as well as a more advantageous course, openly to join England, and to make war against France. The object would be clearly understood, an Ally would be obtained, and the meanness of submission might be better palliated.—It appears unnecessary to pursue any further the examination of propositions, which the difficult situation of the United States could alone have suggested, and which will prove more inadmissible, or impracticable, as the subject is more thoroughly investigated. The alternative is painful; it is between a continual suspension of commerce and war with both England and France. But the choice must ultimately be made between the two; and it is important that we should be prepared for either the one or the other.—The aggressions of England and France, collectively affecting almost the whole of our commerce, and persisted in, notwithstanding repeated remonstrances, explanations, and propositions the most candid and unexceptionable, are to all intents and purposes, a maritime war waged by both nations against the United States. It cannot be denied, that the ultimate and only effectual mode of resisting that warfare, if persisted in, is war. A permanent suspension of commerce, after repeated and unavailing efforts to obtain peace, would not properly be resistance: it would be withdrawing from the contest, and abandoning our indisputable right freely to navigate the ocean. The present unsettled state of the world, the extraordinary situation in which

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the United States are placed, and the necessity, if war be resorted to, of making it at the same time against both nations, and these the two most powerful of the world, are the principal causes of hesitation. There would be none in resorting to that remedy, however calamitous, if a selection could be made on any principle of justice, or without a sacrifice of national independence.—On a question of such difficulty, involving the most important interests of the Union, and which has not, perhaps, until lately, been sufficiently considered, your Committee think the house alone competent to pronounce a decisive opinion: and they have, in this report, confined themselves to an exposition of the subject, and to such introductory resolutions, as will be equally applicable to either alternative. The first of these being merely declaratory of a determination not to submit to foreign aggressions, may, perhaps, at a first view, appear superfluous. It is however, believed by the committee, that a pledge by the representatives of the nation, that they will not abandon its essential rights, will not at this critical moment be unacceptable.—The misapprehensions which seem to have existed, and the misrepresentations which have been circulated, respecting the state of our foreign relations, render also such declaration expedient. And it may not be useless that every foreign nation should understand that its aggressions never will be justified or encouraged by any decription of American citizens. For the question for every citizen now is, whether he will rally round the government of his choice, or enlist under foreign banners? Whether he will be for his country or against his country?

Report of a Committee of the House of Representatives of Massachusetts, upon the subject of the Embargo, dated 15th Nov. 1808.

The committee appointed to consider "Whether it will be expedient for this legislature to adopt any measure with a view to procure a repeal of the laws of the United States, interdicting to the citizens all foreign commerce, and imposing vexatious embarrassments on the coasting trade; to relieve the people of the commonwealth from their present distressed state, and to arrest the progress of that ruin which threatens to involve all classes of the community," beg leave to report: That the committee perceive with the most serious regret, that the distresses occasioned by the several laws imposing an embargo, have borne with extreme and increasing pressure upon the people; and every day's experience justifies a belief that a continuance of these laws must soon become intolerable. As measures of coercion, they are now acknowledged to be altogether impotent. They afford satisfaction to France, and are regarded as ineffectual demonstrations of a hostile disposition by Great Britain. Upon our own country, their effects are becoming daily and palpably more injurious. The produce of our agriculture, of our forests, and our fisheries, is excluded altogether from every foreign market; our merchants and mechanics are deprived of employment; our coasting trade is interrupted and harrassed by the most grievous embarrassments; and our foreign trade is becoming diverted into channels, from which there is no prospect of its return. The sources of our revenue are dried up, and government must soon resort to direct taxation. Our sailors are forced to expatriate themselves. Strong temptations are offered to systematical evasions of the laws, which tend to corrupt the spirit of honourable commerce, and will materially injure the public morals. In fact, the evils which are menaced by the continuance of this policy are so enormous and deplorable, the suspension of commerce is so contrary to the habits of our people, and so repugnant to their feelings and interests, that they must soon become intolerable, and endanger our domestic peace and the union of these states. As the embargo laws have been the cause of the public distress, your committee are of opinion that no equal, permanent, or effectual relief can be afforded to the citizens of the commonwealth, but by the repeal of these laws. They persuade themselves that the congress of the United States must be fully impressed with a sense of the total inefficacy of these laws for any valuable purpose, and of their direct tendency to the most serious consequences. Your committee, therefore, trust, that congress will not fail to repeal them. In this confidence, therefore, your committee are of opinion, that, upon this subject, the legislature should, in its present session, confine itself to a repeated disapprobation of the laws interdicting foreign commerce, and to instructing our senators, and requesting our representatives in congress to use their utmost exertions to procure their repeal.—Your committee might have contented themselves with the preceding remarks, had not the late Message of the President of the United States excited the most serious

alarm; which, in the present critical state of the country, they conceive it a duty to express. They perceive, with the most painful regret, that, in the estimation of the president, our country is now presented with the only alternative of a continued embargo, or a ruinous war; but they cannot hesitate to express their confident belief that the wisdom of the government may yet find means to avoid the necessity of electing between these great public calamities. If, however, this severe necessity exists in regard to Great Britain, they are led by the message to presume that it results, in a great measure, if not entirely, from the determination of the executive to adhere to the proclamation of July, 1807, interdicting all British ships of war from the waters of the United States; which has been, and as we infer from the message, is still deemed by the British Goverment, a measure so inhospitable and oppressive, if not hostile in its character, as to form an insuperable obstacle to amicable adjustment.—Upon this delicate and important subject, the committee are far from asserting, that the attack on the frigate Chesapeake did not justify the original issuing of this proclamation, and enforcing it so long as the injury might be presumed to have the sanction of the British government. But as this violation of the neutral rights was promptly and explicitly disavowed by the Sovereign of the aggressor, before the remonstrances or measures of our government could be known: as the right to search our national ships was expressly disclaimed, and a special envoy deputed for the professed object of making to our government a full, satisfactory, and public reparation, on the simple condition of a previous revocation of this proclamation; your committee are constrained to declare their opinion, that such a revocation, under such circumstances, would not have involved any dishonourable concession, or an abandonment of any just right of pretensions, but would have been a fair, reasonable, and magnanimous pledge of the sincerity of the wishes of the American Government to restore the accustomed relations of peace and amity between the two countries. This course must have compelled the British envoy to have offered that ample and honourable reparation, which would have been deemed by our nation and by the world, an adequate atonement for the outrage; or have justified, in the event of its refusal, not only the renewal of the proclamation, but the adoption of measures of the most rigorous and hostile description. — But even on the precise presumption that the course adopted by the government, in refusing to revoke the proclamation as a preliminary to the adjustment of that controversy, be sanctioned by the usages of nations, and the justice of our claims, your Committee are still of opinion, that a punctilious adherence to diplomatic forms and precedents should not be maintained at the risk of war, by a nation whose genius and policy are pacific; and which, while justly jealous of its national honour and independance, looks principally to the substantial security of those blessings, and regards as insignificant those petty contentions which originating in courtly pride and vanity, frequently terminate in bloody wars: and they, therefore, think that this proclamation ought not, in the present situation of Europe and this country, to remain as the only, or even as the principal, barrier to the restoration of our amicable relations with the British nation.—Your Committee therefore ask leave to report the following resolutions:—Resolved, that the Senators of this commonwealth in congress, be instructed, and the representatives thereof requested, to use their strenuous exertions to procure an immediate repeal of the various laws imposing an embargo on the ships and vessels of the United States; as the only equal and effectual means of affording permanent relief to the citizens of this commonwealth from the aggravated evils which they now experience.—Resolved, that although this legislature would cheerfully support the general government in the prosecution of a just and necessary war, yet they cannot perceive the necessity intimated in the message of the President to congress, of continuing the embargo, or resorting to war. That it is not the policy of the United States to engage in a controversy with any nation, upon points of diplomatic usage, or equivocal right, provided substantial reparation for injuries can be obtained; and that the revocation of the proclamation interdicting the British ships of war from our waters ought not, in the opinion of this legislature, to be deemed an inadmissible preliminary, which should obstruct the adjustment of the controversy between the United States and Great Britain.

Twenty-first Bulletin of the French Army in Spain. (No Date.)

The English entered Spain on the 29th Oct. during the months of Nov. and Dec.

they beheld the destruction of the army of Gallicia at Espinosa; of the army of Estremadura at Burgos, of that of Arragon and Valencia, at Tudela; of the army of reserve at Somo-Sierra; in fine, they beheld the fall of Madrid without making a single movement, and without any attempt to succour the Spanish armies, to whom, however, a division of the English troops would have proved of considerable assistance. In the beginning of December, information was received that the columns of the British army were retreating on Corunna, where they were to re-embark. By later accounts, it afterwards appeared that they had halted, and that on the 10th Dec. they set out from Salamanca in order to take the field. As early as the 15th, the light cavalry had marched from Valladolid. The whole of the English army passed the Douro, and arrived on the 23d in presence of the duke of Dalmatia at Saldanha.—As soon as the Emperor was apprised at Madrid of this unexpected determination on the part of the English, he marched in order to cut off their retreat, and pursue their rear. But notwithstanding the diligence exerted by the French troops, the passage of the mountain of Guadarrama, which was covered with snow, the incessant rain, and overflowing of the torrents, delayed their march full two days.—On the 22d the Emperor left Madrid. His head-quarters were on the 23d at Villa-Castin, the 25th at Tordesillas, and on the 27th at Medino de Rio-Secco. On the 24th, at break of day, the enemy had began to move, in order to outflank the left of the duke of Dalmatia, but having been informed during the morning of the movement that took place at Madrid, they immediately began to retreat, abandoning their Spanish adherents, whose passions they had inflamed, the remains of the Gallician army, that had conceived fresh hopes, some of their hospitals, a part of their baggage, and a great number of stragglers. They committed great devastations, the inevitable result of forced marches of troops in retreat; they carried away with them mules, horses, and several other effects; they pillaged a great number of churches and convents. In the abbey of Sahagun, which contained 60 monks, and which had all along been respected by the French army, they committed every sort of depredation. Every where the priests and the monks were seen flying at their approach.—This disorderly conduct exasperated the country against them, and their difference of language, manners, and of religion, contributed not a little to that disposition of men's minds. They reproached the Spaniards with having no longer an army to unite with theirs, and with having deceived the English government. The Spaniards returned for answer, that Spain had numerous armies, but that the English had allowed them to be destroyed without having made any effort to assist them. During the 15 days that have just elapsed, they did not fire a single musket. The light cavalry only had given some blows with their swords. Gen. Duresnel, at the head of 400 light horse of the guard, fell in at the close of the evening with a column of English infantry on their march, sabred a number of soldiers, and carried disorder into the columns.—Gen. Lefebvre, Disnonettes, colonel of the chasseurs of the guard, detached two days before, with three squadrons of his regiment, having taken a quantity of baggage, of women, and stragglers, and finding the bridge of Ezela cut down, imagined that the town of Benavente was evacuated. Carried away by that impetuosity with which the French soldiers have been so often reproached, he swam across the river, in order to make for Benavente, where he fell in with the whole of the cavalry of the rear-guard of the English: a long contest here ensued, of 400 men against 2000. There was no resisting numbers. Those brave fellows recrossed the river. The horse of gen. Lefebvre was killed by a ball. He had himself received a wound from a pistol shot, and, being dismounted, was made prisoner. Ten of his chasseurs, who had also been dismounted, were likewise taken, 5 were drowned, and 20 were wounded. This sharp affair must have convinced the English what they would have to dread from such men in general action; gen. Lefebvre undoubtedly committed a fault, but it was the fault of a Frenchman; he ought to be blamed and rewarded at the same time. The number of prisoners taken from the enemy, up to the present moment, and who are chiefly composed of scattered individuals and stragglers, amounts to 300.—On the 28th the head-quarters of the Emperor were at Valderas; the head-quarters of the duke of Dalmatia at Manilla, the duke of Elchingen at Villatora. On his departure from Madrid, the Emperor appointed king Joseph his lieut.-general, with the command of the garrison of the capital, together with the corps of the dukes of Dantzic and Belluno; the divisions of cavalry of Lasalle, Milhaud, and Latour Maubourg,

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

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sort of sacrifice—some religious rite—which gives rise, in the mind of the Spaniards, to very strange pictures of the religion of England. The English are retreating in the utmost haste. All the Germans in their pay are deserting. Our army will, this evening, be at Astorga near the borders of Gallicia.

Twenty-Third-Bulletin.

Benavente, Jan. 1.—The duke of Dalmatia arrived on the 30th December at Mancille, where was the left of the enemy, consisting of the Spaniards under gen. Romana. Gen. Franceschi overthrew them in a single charge, killed a great number, took two standards, and made prisoners a colonel, two lieut. colonels, fifty officers, and 1, 500 men.—On the 31st the duke of Dalmatia entered Leon, where he found 2000 sick. Romana succeeded Blake in the command, after the battle of Espnosa. The remains of that army, which, while before Bilboa, consisted of 50,000 men, were reduced to almost 5000 at Mancilla. These wretches, without clothes, and oppressed with every misery, filled the hospitals.—The English are held in detestation by these troops whom they despise, and by the peaceable inhabitants whom they abuse and whose substance they devour, in order to support their own army.—The mind of the people of the kingdom of Leon is much changed. They loudly cry out for Peace and their King; they curse the English and their fallacious insinuations. They reproach them with being the cause of the shedding of Spanish blood, in order to feed the English monopoly, and perpetuate the war on the continent. The perfidy of England and her motives are now obvious to the meanest and most illiterate Spanish peasant. They know what they suffer: and the authors of their sufferings are before their eyes.—Meantime the English retreat with the utmost haste, pursued by the duke of Istria, with 9000 cavalry. Among the magazines which they burnt at Benevente, were, independant of tents, 4000 blankets, and a great quantity of rum. We picked up upwards of 200 waggons of baggage and ammunition, left on the road from Benevente to Astorga. The shattered remains of Romana's army threw themselves into the latter town, and increased the confusion.—The events of the English expedition to Spain must furnish materials for a fine opening speech to the English Parliament. The English nation must be informed, that her army remained three months in a state of inaction, while it was in their power to assist the Spaniards; that its leaders, or those whose orders they executed, have been guilty of the extreme folly of making a movement forward after the Spanish armies had been destroyed; that, in a word, it entered upon the new year by running away, pursued by an enemy, whom it did not dare to fight, and by the curses of those whom it had stirred up to resistance, and whom it was its duty to support. Such enterprizes and such results can belong only to a country that has no government. Fox, or even Pitt, would not have been guilty of such blunders. To contend against France by land, who has one hundred thousand cavalry, fifty thousand horses for all sorts of military equipment, and nine hundred thousand infantry, was, on the part of England, carrying folly to the utmost extreme; it betrays indeed a greediness for disgrace; it is, in fine, to administer the affairs of England just as the cabinet of the Thuilleries could wish them to be administered.—It betrays no small ignorance of Spain, to have imagined that any importance could be attached to popular commotion, or to indulge the smallest hope that by kindling in that country the flames of sedition, such a conflagration could be attended with any decided result or any material duration.—A few fanatical priests are quite sufficient to compose and propagate libels, to carry a momentary disorder into the minds of men: but something else is required to cause a nation to rise to arms.—At the time of the French Revolution, it required three years and the presence of the convention to prepare the means of military successes; and who that does not know to what hazards France was nevertheless exposed? France was, however, stirred up. Supported by the unanimous resolution to reassert rights of which she had been deprived in times of obscurity. In Spain, it was a few men who stirred up the people, in order to preserve the exclusive possession of rights odious to the people. Those who fought for the inquisition, for the Franciscans, and for feudal rights, might be animated by an ardent zeal for their personal interests, but could never infuse into a whole nation a firm resolve or a permanent opinion. In spite of the English feudal rights, the Franciscans, and the inquisition, have no longer any existence in Spain.—After the capture of Rosas, gen. Gouvion Saint-Cyr shaped his march against Barcelona, at the head of the 7th corps. He dispersed every thing that he found before that place, and formed a junction with gen. Duhesme. That junction

brought his army to 40,000 men.—The dukes of Treviso and Abrantes have carried all the outworks at Saragossa. The gen. of engineers, Lacoste, is preparing the means of getting possession of that city without loss.—The king of Spain has gone to Aranjuez, in order to review the first corps, commanded by the duke of Belluno.

Twenty-fourth Bulletin.

Astorga, Jan. 2.—The Emperor arrived at Astorga on the 1st of Jan. The road from Benevente to Astorga is covered with dead horses belonging to the English, with travelling carriages, artillery, caissons and warlike stores. There were found at Astorga magazines of sheets, blankets, and the tools and implements of pioneers.—As to Romana's army, it is reduced almost to nothing. The small number that remain are without coats, shoes, pay, food, and it is no longer to be considered any thing.—The Emperor has charged the duke of Dalmatia with the glorious mission of pursuing the English to the place of their debarkation, and of driving them into the sea, at the point of the sword.—The English will learn what it is to make an inconsiderate movement in presence of the French army. The manner in which they have been driven from the kingdoms of Leon and Gallicia, and the destruction of a part of their army, will, no doubt, teach them to be more circumspect of their operations on the continent.—All that remains of the Spanish insurgent troops has been without pay for several months back.

Battle of Corunna.—*London Gazette Extraordinary, dated Downing-street, Jan. 24, 1809.*

The hon. captain Hope arrived late last night with a dispatch from lieut.-gen. sir David Baird to lord viscount Castlereagh, one of his majesty's principal secretaries of state, of which the following is a copy:

His majesty's ship Ville de Paris, at sea, Jan. 18, 1809.—My Lord; By the much-lamented death of lieut.-general sir John Moore, who fell in action with the enemy on the 16th instant, it has become my duty to acquaint your lordship, that the French army attacked the British troops in the position they occupied in front of Corunna, at about 2 o'clock in the afternoon of that day.—A severe wound, which compelled me to quit the field a short time previous to the fall of sir John Moore, obliges me to refer your lordship for the particulars of the action, which was long and obstinately contested, to the inclosed Report of lieut.-gen. Hope, who succeeded to the command of the army, and to whose ability and exertions in direction of the ardent zeal and unconquerable valour of his majesty's troops, is to be attributed, under Providence, the success of the day, which terminated in the complete and entire repulse and defeat of the enemy at every point of attack. The hon. capt. Gordon, my aid-de-camp, will have the honour of delivering this dispatch, and will be able to give your lordship any further information which may be required. I have the honour to be, &c. D. Baird, lieut.-gen.

His majesty's ship Audacious, off Corunna, Jan. 18, 1809.—Sir; In compliance with the desire contained in your communication of yesterday, I avail myself of the first moment I have been able to command, to detail to you the occurrences of the action which took place in front of Corunna, on the 16th instant.—It will be in your recollection, that about one in the afternoon of that day, the enemy, who had in the morning received reinforcements, and who had placed some guns in front of the right and left of his line, was observed to be moving troops towards his left flank, and forming various columns of attack at that extremity of the strong and commanding position, which, on the morning of the 15th, he had taken in our immediate front.—This indication of his intention was immediately succeeded by the rapid and determined attack which he made upon your division, which occupied the right of our position. The events which occurred during that period of the action you are fully acquainted with. The first effort of the enemy was met by the commander of the forces, and by yourself, at the head of the 42nd regt., and the brigade under major-gen. lord William Bentinck.—The village on your right became an object of obstinate contest.—I lament to say, that soon after the severe wound which deprived the army of your services, lieut.-gen. sir John Moore, who had just directed the most able dispositions, fell by a cannon-shot. The troops, though not unacquainted with the irreparable loss they had sustained, were not dismayed, but by the most determined bravery not only repelled every attempt of the enemy to gain ground, but actually forced him to retire, although he had brought up fresh troops in support of those originally engaged.—The enemy, finding himself foiled in every attempt to force

the right of the position, endeavoured by numbers to turn it. A judicious and well-timed movement, which was made by major-gen. Paget, with the reserve, which corps had moved out of its cantonments to support the right of the army, by a vigorous attack, defeated this intention. The major-general having pushed forward the 95th (rifle corps) and 1st battalion 52nd regiments, drove the enemy before him, and in his rapid and judicious advance, threatened the left of the enemy's position. This circumstance, with the position of lieut.-gen. Fraser's division, (calculated to give still further security to the right of the line) induced the enemy to relax his efforts in that quarter.—They were however more forcibly directed towards the centre, where they were again successfully resisted by the brigade under major-gen. Manningham, forming the left of your division, and a part of that under major-gen. Leith, forming the right of the division under my orders. Upon the left, the enemy at first contented himself with an attack upon our picquets, which however in general maintained their ground. Finding however his efforts unavailing on the right and centre, he seemed determined to render the attack upon the left more serious, and had succeeded in obtaining possession of the village through which the great road to Madrid passes, and which was situated in front of that part of the line. From this post, however, he was soon expelled, with considerable loss, by a gallant attack of some companies of the 2nd battalion 14th regiment, under lieut.-colonel Nicholls; before five in the evening, we had not only successfully repelled every attack made upon the position, but had gained ground in almost all points, and occupied a more forward line than at the commencement of the action, whilst the enemy confined his operations to a cannonade, and a fire of his light troops, with a view to draw off his other corps. At six the firing entirely ceased. The different brigades were re-assembled on the ground they occupied in the morning, and the picquets and advanced posts resumed their original stations.—Notwithstanding the decided and marked superiority which at this moment the gallantry of the troops had given them over an enemy, who, from his number and the commanding advantages of his position, no doubt expected an easy victory, I did not, on reviewing all circumstances, conceive that I should be warranted in departing from what I knew was the fixed and previous determination of the late commander of the forces, to withdraw the army on the evening of the 16th, for the purpose of embarkation, the previous arrangements for which had already been made by his order, and were, in fact, far advanced at the commencement of the action. The troops quitted their position about ten at night, with a degree of order that did them credit. The whole of the artillery that remained unembarked having been withdrawn, the troops followed in the order prescribed, and marched to their respective points of embarkation in the town and neighbourhood of Corunna. The picquets remained at their posts until five in the morning of the 17th, when they were also withdrawn with similar orders, and without the enemy having discovered the movement.—By the unremitted exertions of captains the hon. H. Curzon, Gosselin, Boys, Rainier, Serrett, Hawkins, Digby, Carden, and Mackenzie, of the royal navy, who, in pursuance of the orders of rear adm. de Courcy, were entrusted with the service of embarking the army; and in consequence of the arrangements made by commissioner Bowen, captains Bowen and Shepherd, and the other agents for transports, the whole of the army were embarked with an expedition which has seldom been equalled. With the exception of the brigades under major-generals Hill and Beresford, which were destined to remain on shore, until the movements of the enemy should become manifest, the whole was afloat before day light.—The brigade of major-gen. Beresford, which was alternately to form our rear-guard, occupied the land front of the town of Corunna; that under major-Gen. Hill was stationed in reserve on the promontory in rear of the town.—The enemy pushed his light troops towards the town soon after eight o'clock in the morning of the 17th, and shortly after occupied the heights of St. Lucia, which command the harbour. But notwithstanding this circumstance, and the manifold defects of the place, there being no apprehension that the rear-guard could be forced, and the disposition of the Spaniards appearing to be good, the embarkation of maj.-gen. Hill's brigade was commenced and completed by 3 in the afternoon; maj.-gen. Beresford, with that zeal and ability which is so well known to yourself and the whole army, having fully explained, to the satisfaction of the Spanish governor, the nature of our movement, and having made every previous arrangement, withdrew his corps from the land front of the town soon after dark, and was,

with all the wounded that had not been previously moved, embarked before one this morning.—Circumstances forbid us to indulge the hope, that the victory with which it has pleased Providence to crown the efforts of the army, can be attended with any very brilliant consequences to Great Britain. It is clouded by the loss of one of her best soldiers. It has been achieved at the termination of a long and harassing service. The superior numbers, and advantageous position of the enemy, not less than the actual situation of this army, did not admit of any advantage being reaped from success. It must be however to you, to the army, and to our country, the sweetest reflection, that the lustre of the British arms has been maintained, amidst many disadvantageous circumstances. The army which had entered Spain, amidst the fairest prospects, had no sooner completed its junction, than owing to the multiplied disasters that dispersed the native armies around us, it was left to its own resources. The advance of the British corps from the Duero, afforded the best hope that the south of Spain might be relieved, but this generous effort to save the unfortunate people, also afforded the enemy the opportunity of directing every effort of his numerous troops, and concentrating all his principal resources for the destruction of the only regular force in the north of Spain.—You are well aware with what diligence this system has been pursued.—These circumstances produced the necessity of rapid and harassing marches, which had diminished the numbers, exhausted the strength, and impaired the equipment of the army. Notwithstanding all these disadvantages, and those more immediately attached to a defensive position, which the imperious necessity of covering the harbour of Corunna for a time had rendered indispensable to assume, the native and undaunted valour of British troops was never more conspicuous, and must have exceeded what even your own experience of that invaluable quality, so inherent in them, may have taught you to expect. When every one that had an opportunity seemed to vie in improving it, it is difficult for me, in making this report, to select particular instances for your approbation. The corps chiefly engaged were the brigades under major-generals lord Wm. Bentinck, and Mannigham, and Leith; and the brigade of guards under major-gen. Warde.—To these officers, and the troops under their immediate orders, the greatest praise is due. Major-gen. Hill and col. Catlin Crawford, with their brigades on the left of the position, ably supported their advanced posts. The brunt of the action fell upon the 4th, 42d, 50th, and 81st regiments, with parts of the brigade of guards, and the 26th regiment. From lieut. col. Murray, quarter-master-general, and the officers of the general staff, I received the most marked assistance. I had reason to regret, that the illness of brigadier-general Clinton, adjutant-general, deprived me of his aid. I was indebted to brigadier-general Slade during the action, for a zealous offer of his personal services, although the cavalry were embarked.—The greater part of the fleet having gone to sea, yesterday evening, the whole being under weigh, and the corps in the embarkation necessarily much mixed on board, it is impossible, at present, to lay before you a return of our casualties. I hope the loss in numbers is not so considerable as might have been expected. If I was obliged to form an estimate, I should say, that I believe it did not exceed in killed and wounded from seven to eight hundred; that of the enemy must remain unknown, but many circumstances induce me to rate it at nearly double the above number. We have some prisoners, but I have not been able to obtain an account of the number; it is not, however, considerable. Several officers of rank have fallen, or been wounded, among whom I am only at present enabled to state the names of lieut.-col. Napier, 92d reg., majors Napier and Stanhope, 50th reg., killed; lieut.-col. Winch, 4th reg., lieut.-col. Maxwell, 26th reg., lieut-col. Fane, 59th reg., lieut.-col. Griffith, guards, majors Miller and Williams, 81st reg., wounded.—To you, who are well acquainted with the excellent qualities of lieut.-gen. sir John Moore, I need not expatiate on the loss the army and his country have sustained by his death. His fall has deprived me of a valuable friend, to whom long experience of his worth had sincerely attached me. But it is chiefly on public grounds that I must lament the blow. It will be the conversation of every one who loved or respected his manly character, that, after conducting the army through an arduous retreat with consummate firmness, he has terminated a career of distinguished honour by a death that has given the enemy additional reason to respect the name of a British soldier. Like the immortal Wolfe, he is snatched from his country at an early period of a life spent in her service; like

Wolfe, his last moments were gilded by the prospect of success, and cheered by the acclamation of victory; like Wolfe, also, his memory will for ever remain sacred in that country which he sincerely loved, and which he had so faithfully served.—It remains for me only to express my hope, that you will speedily be restored to the service of your country, and to lament the unfortunate circumstance that removed you from your station in the field, and threw the momentary command into far less able hands. I have the honour to be, &c.—JOHN HOPE, lieut.-gen.

To lieut.-gen. sir D. Baird, &c. &c.

Supplement to the London Gazette Extraordinary, dated Admiralty-Office, January 24, 1809.

Copy of a Letter from the hon. Michael De Courcy, rear-adm. of the White, to the hon. William Wellesley Pole, dated on board his majesty's ship the Tonnant, at Corunna, the 17th and 18th instant.

January 17, 1809.—Sir: Having it in design to detach the Cossack to England as soon as her boats shall cease to be essential to the embarkation of troops, I seize a moment to acquaint you, for the information of the lords commissioners of the admiralty, that the ships of war, as per margin, [Ville de Paris, Victory, Barfleur, Zealous, Implacable, Elizabeth, Norge, Plantagenet, Resolution, Audacious, Endymion, Mediator,] and transports under the orders of rear-adm. sir Samuel Hood, and commissioner Bowen, arrived at this anchorage from Vigo on the 14th and 15th instant; the Alfred and Hindostan, with some transports, were left at Vigo to receive a brigade of three thousand five hundred men, that had taken that route under generals Alten and Crawford.—In the vicinity of Corunna, the enemy have pressed upon the British in great force. The embarkation of the sick, the cavalry, and the stores, went on. The night of the 16th was appointed for the general embarkation of the infantry; and mean time, the enemy prepared for attack. At three p. m. an action commenced; the enemy, which had been posted on a lofty hill, endeavouring to force the British on another hill of inferior height, and nearer the town.—The enemy were driven back with great slaughter: but very sorry am I to add, that the British, though triumphant, have suffered severe losses. I am unable to communicate further particulars, than that sir John Moore received a mortal wound, of which he died at night; that sir David Baird lost an arm; that several officers and many men have been killed and wounded: and that the ships of war have received all such of the latter as they could accommodate, the remainder being sent to transports.—The weather is now tempestuous, and the difficulties of embarkation are great. All except the rear-guard are embarked; consisting, perhaps, at the present moment, of two thousand six hundred men. The enemy having brought cannon to a hill overhanging the beach, have forced a majority of the transports to cut or slip. Embarkation being no longer practicable at the town, the boats have been ordered to a sandy beach near the light-house; and it is hoped that the greater part, if not all, will still be embarked, the ships of war having dropped out to facilitate embarkation.

Jan. 18. The embarkation of the troops having occupied the greater part of last night, it has not been in my power to detach the Cossack before this day; and it is with satisfaction I am able to add, that, in consequence of the good order maintained by the troops, and the unwearied exertions of commissioner Bowen, the captains and other officers of the navy, the agents, as well as the boat's crews, many of whom were for two days without food and without repose, the army have been embarked to the last man, and the ships are now in the offing, preparatory to steering for England. The great body of the transports having lost their anchors, ran to sea without the troops they were ordered to receive, in consequence of which there are some thousands on board the ships of war. Several transports, through mismanagement, ran on shore. The seamen appeared to have abandoned them, two being brought out by the boats' crews of the men of war, two were burnt, and five were bilged.—I cannot conclude this hasty statement without expressing my great obligation to rear-adm. sir Samuel Hood, whose eye was every where, and whose exertions were unremitted. I have the honour to be, &c. M. DE COURCY.

Hazy weather rendering the Cossack obscure, I detach the Gleaner with this dispatch.

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